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4
Canadian Lawyers
A Peculiar Professionalism
HARRY W. ARTHURS, RICHARD WE ISM AN,
AND FREDERICK H. ZEMANS

Canada is a federal state, embracing two official languages and legal
cultures and ten provincial jurisdictions. Its lawyers are dispersed across
3,000 miles in diverse social settings and economic circumstances, but their
functions are not formally defined or faithfully recorded. Our attempt to
capture a complex reality is made especially difficult because of the extreme paucity of secondary writing on the Canadian legal profession.
These caveats notwithstanding, we believe that Canadian materials may,
indeed, contribute to current theorizing about the professions.
Students of the sociology of law (e.g., Abel, 1981; Heinz & Laumann,
1983) recently have begun to develop an historical and comparative approach to the legal profession, complementing the valuable work of Freidson (1970), Johnson (1972), and Larson (1977) on the more general problem of the professions. Central to this approach is the assumption that "all
occupations under capitalism are compelled to seek market control, the
attainment of which is the defining characteristic of a profession" (Abel,
1981: 1120).

Freidson, in his seminal work on the sociology of medicine (1970),
distinguished professions from other occupations by virtue of their position of hegemonic privilege in the division of labor. Larson (1977) saw
two elements as crucial to the professional project: the creation of a
systematic body of knowledge on which to ground claims to exclusive
competence and the achievement of control over the production of producers of this knowledge. Because the university emphasized formal training, espoused meritocratic standards, and enjoyed high public credibility,
it became the primary vehicle by which professional organizations could
attain these objectives.
Several ambitious recent attempts to track the professional project point
to a decline in professional dominance. Abel suggests that both in England
(see chapter 2) and the United States (see chapter 5) the profession has lost
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significant control over the supply of legal services and that the defensive
strategies, by which it has sought to regain control, have been markedly
ineffective. Heinz and Laumann (1983) also offer evidence of professional
transformation and decline by describing the increasingly sharp division
of the metropolitan bar into mutually exclusive subgroups based on
function, income, ethnicity, and education. The rapid shift from private
practice to employment in both the public and private sectors may be
further evidence of departure from the professional ideal, in which members exercise control over the terms and conditions of their work (Abel,
1981: 1159-1160). Similar trends toward a loss of both market control and
autonomy have been observed in medicine, although the causes of deprofessionalization differ (Coburn et al., 1983; McKinlay & Arches, 1985).
If the theories of Freidson, Larson, and Abel are to have general explanatory value, they must be able to accommodate contexts other than
the American experience from which they were primarily drawn. Can a
theory of the political economy of the professions transcend national
boundaries? Local political forms, culture, economic circumstance, and
social organization, and especially the notorious parochialism of formal
law, all would seem to argue against this. Canada's transformation from an
agrarian colony to a modem industrial nation during the formative period
of professionalism especially might be expected to yield a distinctive
pattern, unlike that of the two countries that most influenced its professional history-England and the United States. Given these considerations, the wonder is not that the Canadian experience seems to invite
modification of the "professional project" thesis but rather that it seems
generally to confirm it.

TERMINOLOGY
In general padance, legal practitioners everywhere in Canada are called
"lawyers" ("avocats" in Quebec). The historical distinction between barristers and solicitors no longer has any functional significance (see, e.g., Law
Society Ad, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, s. 28; Barristers and Solicitors
Ad, Rev. Stat. Nova Scotia 1967, c. 18 ss. 3-5; Barristers and Solicitors
Ad, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26, s. 42). In Quebec "notaires"
are concerned with the formalization, authentication, and preservation of
title documents, wills, and other legal instruments. 1 Lawyers who perform
adjudicative or regulatory functions may suspend or terminate their formal
professional membership and will be referred to thereafter as judges,
members of a board or commission, and so on. 2 A purely honorific title,
"Queen's Counsel," has been awarded to a rather large number of lawyers
in some provinces, (such as Ontario), and fewer in others. It does not signal
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preeminence in advocacy (as it does in England) but merely some degree
of seniority and professional or public repute-if anything. 3
Lawyers perform a variety of tasks, many of which require little or no
specialized training but are functionally related to. others that do (Colvin,
1979; Macfarlane, 1980; Colvin et al., 1978). The two historic functions of
lawyers, conveyancing and litigation, have acquired an extended meaning.
For Canadian lawyers, the modem analogue to "conveyancing" is the practice of commerical law, which includes the negotiation, drafting, and interpretation of commercial documents; advising and planning for commercial
transactions; corporate and tax planning; and general business and political
advice. Lawyers also advise individual, nonbusiness clients about family
relationships, financial affairs, dealings with government over pensions,
and other benefits and employment contracts.
"Litigation" in the strict sense includes representation of parties in a
dispute that will be adjudicated by a court. It now also encompasses representation before government regulatory.regimes, interpretation of existing
legislation, attempts to change legislation, and contacts with the media.
A small but growing group of lawyers is concerned with the "scientific
jobs" in law. These include not only legal academics but also employees of
government departments, law reform commissions, research staffs of corporations and community groups and specialist researchers in large law
firms. Finally, some lawyers are deeply involved in political and administrative functions that seldom engage the skills employed by those in
private practice. Corporate and governmental administrators, lobbyists,
journalists, and elected officials are found along the broad spectrum of
these "nonlegal" occupations.
The more attenuated the connection with the original knowledge base
of lawyer functions, the more likely it is that nonlawyers will be important
actors in the same field (Colvin, 1979; Quinn, 1978; Evans & Trebilcock,
1982); thus, business advice often involves accountants. Lay persons are
advocates in many tribunals not mandated to administer conventional
legal rules. The development of "legal science" increasingly attracts the
participation of economists, sociologists, scientists, and philosophers. Lawyers are not even dominant in public policy development and administration (Marmour & White, 1978; Ronson, 1978; Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980).
In matters more closely related to conveyancing and litigation, however, lawyers tend to assume an exclusive or dominant role. "Law clerks"
or "legal assistants" typically work under the supervision of qualified
lawyers (Tarnan, 1978; Zemans, 1982). Sometimes they are given considerable latitude in preparing routine documents and prosecuting legal proceedings, especially in minor matters (see table 1). "Community legal
workers," "lay advocates," or "paralegals" perform analogous functions in
legal aid offices (Gold, 1978; Thomasset, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Zemans,
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1982). 4 Typically, however, the latter enjoy rather greater autonomy,
particularly in areas such as community mobilization and legal education.
Neither "law clerks" nor "community legal workers" need have any particular training or formal credentials, although courses and training programs
are available (Marmor & White, 1978; Ronson, 1978). 5
Accountants, trade union representatives, and others do have limited
rights of audience in certain forums, 6 and they may negotiate, draft, and
interpret certain legal documents as long as they do not engage in the
"practice of law." Their activities typically involve immigration, labor
relations, social welfare, and landlord-tenant problems, but they also
extend to taxation, estate planning, and the financial and corporate transactions of middle-class and corporate clients. In some jurisdictions, patent
attorneys or patent agents may practice industrial property law (Patent
Ad, Rev. Stat. Canada, 1970, c. 203, s. 15), "conveyancers" perform title
searches and related functions (Trebilcock & Reiter, 1982: 101), notaries
public and notaires authenticate documents, and commissioners swear affidavits (Schloesser, 1979).

SOCIOGRAPHIC DATA AND SOCIAL POSITION
NUMBERS

The following data describe lawyers who are licensed to practice, but an
increasing proportion of those who obtain a professional qualification do
not enter private practice. In Ontario, the most populous province, the
proportion of graduates entering private practice declined from 86 percent
to 70 percent over a period of about ten years, while the number of qualified lawyers doubled (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1983b).
In 1982 there were about 39,000 lawyers in Canada (including Quebec
notaires) (Canadian Law List, 1983). This represents significant: growth
since the mid-1960s as well as a significant decline in the ratio of population to lawyers. In Ontario, the ratio fell from 1,142 in 1960 to 574 in
1981 (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1983b: 227). Between 1931and1981
the number of lawyers expanded much more rapidly (278 percent) than
that of physicians (183 percent) or dentists (123 percent), although slightly
less rapidly than that of architects (309 percent).
These changes seem to have resulted in part from a demographic
anomaly. The fow numbers entering the profession in the 1940s and 1950s
produced equally low numbers of retirements and deaths in the 1970s and
1980s. The birth rate peaked at 27.6 live births per 1,000 population
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between 1956 and 1960 and then declined to a low of 15.5 in J.977. The
combination of these two factors amplified the drop in the ratio of population to lawyers. There was little change in the popularity of law studies
among university students, however: They attracted 2.2 percent of total
enrollment in 1962 and 2.9 percent from 1973 to 1983 (Consultative
Group on Research and Education in Law, 1983). Nonetheless, because
the changes occurred after a protracted period of stability (Stager, 1982),
they have come to be perceived (especially in professional circles) as unprecedented. In fact, they seem to be part of a long-term trend in which
episodes of rapid expansion alternate with lengthy periods when the supply remains constant or contracts (Neiligan, 1950; 1951).

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Two provinces contain nearly two-thirds of all Canadian lawyers; three
contain nearly four-fifths (see table 2). Lawyers are clustered in the most
economically advanced and densely populated parts of the country and in
government centers (Berger, 1979). Winnipeg contains almost 80 percent
of Manitoba lawyers, and Edmonton and Calgary combined contain more
than 80 percent of Alberta's lawyers, although only half of the population
(Statistics Canada, 1981). Toronto, a provincial capital and the commercial
center of the country, located in the midst of the industrial heartland,
contains about 10 percent of the population but about 25 percent of all
lawyers. Conversely, small towns in remote areas often have few lawyers
and almost certainly a much higher ratio of population to lawyers than is
found in the major metropolises.

DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE PROFESSION

There also are considerable differences between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan practice and even between the city core and suburbs (Berger,
1979; Mullagh, 1977; Snider, 1981; Colvin et al., 1978). General practitioners predominate outside metropolitan centers (Berger, 1979; Ribordy,
1982a: 83). This is partly because there are too few people to support
specialization and partly because specialists tend to perform services on
behalf of governments, corporations, and other institutional clients, whose
head offices often are located in the larger cities. Almost all medium-sized
and large law firms are located in the central business and financial districts
of the larger cities. Lawyers catering to a ''household clientele" tend to be
found increasingly in suburban shopping precincts and in storefronts in
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working-class and ethnic districts (Colvin et al., 1978: 25- 220). Outside
the central business districts, small firms and solo practitioners predominate (Arthurs et al., 1971; Berger, 1979).
Identifiable subgroups of lawyers outside private practice have emerged
recently. While there were only some 40 law teachers in all of Canada as
recently as 1950, the number now has grown to over 650 (Consultative
Group on Research and Education in Law, 1983: 30). Government lawyers
working at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels have experienced a
similarly dramatic increase in numbers. The Province of Ontario employed approximately 6 lawyers in the Ministry of the Attorney General
in 1945; by 1981 the ministry's head office employed 150 and local Crown
attorneys' (prosecutors') offices another 500 (Leal, 1982). In the later year,
1,098 out of 15,011 Ontario lawyers were employed by various levels
of government (Stager, 1981). Community clinic lawyers in Ontario increased from 18 in 1976 to 60 in 1983 (Zemans, 1980). Across the country
legal aid services employed 534 lawyers in 1979/80 (National Legal Aid
Research Centre, 1980/81). Corporate staff lawyers (sometimes called
"house counsel") have expanded their numbers greatly, especially in
the past ten years (Feltham & Campin, 1981). Finally, several hundred
lawyers work for community groups, trade unions, legal aid or legal
services schemes, and advocacy organizations such as the Environmental
Law Association or the Civil Liberties Association-forms of practice that
were almost nonexistent fifteen years ago.

THE NUMBERS DEBATE

The relatively rapid increase in the number of lawyers admitted to practice,
especially during the past five to ten years, has produced a widespread
conviction among members of the bar (and some members of the public)
that there are "too many lawyers." 7 In the absence of any other standard
for measuring the appropriate number of lawyers, this belief typically is
supported by reference to the alleged stagnation or decline in lawyer
incomes in recent years. It is by no means clear how incomes have been
affected by rising numbers, however. In fact, with considerable variation
by type of practice, seniority, clientele, and location, Canadian lawyers
have managed to maintain their relatively advantaged position (Altman &
Weil, Inc., 1982; Financial Post 20 [20 November, 1982)). And to the extent
they have not done so, the cause appears to be recent reversals in Canada's
economic fortunes (Stager, 1982: 116-118; Ribordy, 1982b; 1983). During
a period in the early 1980s when the economy was running considerably
under capacity, unemployment in many industries was high, real estate and
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other commercial markets were depressed, and business expansion was
negligible, it was not surprising that lawyer incomes would suffer.
Fluctuation in lawyer incomes is difficult to measure. Average annual
incomes may, indeed, have remained relatively stable, which would signify
an actual decline after adjusting for inflation; however, this may be attributable to the large influx of relatively low earning recent graduates.
There is no evidence that the real earnings of senior "elite" lawyers have
suffered. On the contrary: for reasons that will be discussed below, the
present economic situation may well have amplified existing disparities,
to the prejudice of new entrants, solo practitioners and small firms, lawyers serving a "household clientele" or legally-aided clients, and salaried
lawyers (see table 3).
A second ingredient in the "numbers debate" is the allegation that
incompetence has increased (Yachetti, 1983 ). Because lawyers must cut
prices to compete, it is argued, they also will trim the quality of service
provided. Moreover, lawyers whose traditional sources of business (e.g.,
real estate transactions) have diminished will be tempted to try types of
legal practice (e.g., criminal law) in which they are not experienced. These
allegations remain unsubstantiated. While the latter suggestion seems
plausible, the former is at odds with the fact that the recent significant increases in claims for incompetence result from the activities of experienced
lawyers and from errors committed by them during a period of considerable prosperity (Law $ociety of Upper Canada, 1983b). Indeed, one commentator has argued that too few lawyers trying to satisfy too much demand also may produce incompetent performances (Stager, 1982: 33-34).
Regardless of the facts, it is undeniable that many lawyers favor limiting
entry (Yachetti, 1983: 105). However, it is by no means clear that the
profession possesses the power to give effect to this view. While the
applicability of antitrust legislation to the legal profession is uncertain
(Hunter, 1983), any attempt by the bar to restrict numbers probably would
result in considerable public outcry (Law Society of Upper Canada,
1983b: 234, 238). Governments facing financial constraint might be willing to trim the number of graduating law students in order to save both
the cost of legal education and claims on legal aid funds, however, since
younger lawyers rely more heavily on such work (Berger, 1979: 49-50).
Finally, the impact of market forces has been felt ·most severely by
recent graduates, who have suffered periods of unemployment or been
displaced into nonlegal careers in business, government, or elsewhere
(Stager, I 982; Zemans, 1986; Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, 1983 ). At present, however, law schools continue to
enjoy a vast surplus of highly qualified applicants for the limited number of
places.
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CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

Legal Connections
Lawyers generally identify closely with, and tend to support, legal institutions such as the courts and organizations such as the Bar Association;
however, judges may inspire deference or criticism (or both) rather than
close collegiality. Law professors may consider themselves as either critics
of "the system" or deferential to authority (Laskin, 1972). In addition,
government officials, legal aid and clinic lawyers, tribunal members, and
other lawyers employed by nonlegal employers are .exposed to centrifugal
influences by virtue of their identification with the institutions or organizations where they work.
Nonlegal Connections
Some specialist practitioners maintain close connections with other professions with wh ich they collaborate. For example, physicians and lawyers
comprise the membership of the Medical-Legal Society (MacEachem,
1976t and lawyers and accountants belong to the Canadian Tax Foundation. Much more common, however, are the involvements of lawyers
with their business clients because of annual retainers (sometimes reflecting
decades of close association), the acceptance of directorships, participation
in active management, and partnerships or coventure arrangements. Lawyers also often serve as lobbyists, informal intermediaries, and a responsive
audience for their business clients (Clement, 1975b; Galt 1977; Pike, 1980;
Adam & Lahey, 1981).
Lawyers maintain connections with political parties, religious and ethnic
groups, and special-interest groups such as consumers' associations, credit
unions, and conservation and civil rights organizations. While this sometimes may be motivated by a desire to attract business, it often reflects a
genuine and intense involvement in the cause espoused by the organization. Lawyers constitute important links among the widest variety of
institutions, social sectors, and political perspectives. Indeed, this "linkage"
function may be seen as divided loyalty, which may help to explain why
lawyers so often are viewed with suspicion by the nonlawyers with whom
they are associated.

LAWYERS AND POLITICS

Lawyers are extensively involved in politics (Pasis, 1970; Jackson & Atkinson, 1980; Goodman, 1971; Porter, 1965). Between 1930 and 1985, six
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of the nine prime ministers were lawyers (including one, Pierre E. Trudeau,
who was a law professor). Together they held office for thfrty-five of the
fifty-five years. Significant numbers of federal cabinet ministe;s, provincial
premiers and cabinet ministers, and legislators have been lawyers. While
the proportion of elected officials who are entrepreneurs, teachers, and
members of other occupations is increasing, lawyers remain vastly overrepresented in all Canadian political contexts. For example, 25 percent of
the members of the federal House of Commons were lawyers in 1983, a
higher proportion than in the British Parliament (17 percent in 1974) or the
German Bundestag (5 percent in 1972) (Canadian Parliamentary Guide,
1983; Jackson & Atkinson, 1980: 156). Survey evidence indicates that a
majority of the public prefer legislators who are lawyers (Samac, 1985).
·Moreover, politics is more easily combined with law than with other
careers (Porter, 1965: 393).
Lawyers also are deeply involved in party politics as campaign managers, policy advisers, and strategists. They have not dominated senior
policy positions and administrative positions in government, however,
with two exceptions: (1) administrators performing adjudicative functions
frequently are lawyers; and (2) Royal Commissions, often used in developing major policy initiatives, tend to be chaired by serving or retired judges.
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LEGAL PROFESSION

The public is ambivalent toward lawyers. On one hand, it views them as
untrustworthy; on the other hand, it respects Supreme Court judges; and
those who have used lawyers' services are very satisfied; (Yale, 1982;
More, 1982; but see Moore, 1980). There is ample literary evidence that
Canadians dislike legalism, the aggressive and obfuscatory style of lawyers,
and their apparent influence (Robins, 1971; Farris, 1972). Canadians also
view themselves as law-abiding; they recently adopted a constitutional
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Russell, 1982; Arthurs, 1984), and they
are quick to assume that "there ought to be a law" to deal with perceived
social, economic, and even cultural problems.
In one important-respect, however, Canadian lawyers have at least
avoided attracting public censure, if they have not won public approbation. The introduction of legal aid in Canada proceeded without significant
professional opposition, even with professional acquiescence and occasional support. Jn some provinces, the profession advocated the establishment of legal aid in order to win the right to administer the plan. By
contrast, the medical profession resolutely opposed the introduction of
medical insw·ance and has continued to criticize it, seek ways of working
outside it, and encourage public opposition to the notion of "state medi-
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cine." Ironically, none of these maneuvers appears to have damaged public
admiration for, and trust in, physicians.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF LAWYERS
SIGNIFICANCE

Canada is a country of considerable ethnic diversity, especially since
World War II (Richmond, 1967). Whereas members of ethnic minorities
and disadvantaged groups in the United States gained entry to the profession through unaccredited, low-status, part-time law schools, no such
route existed in Canada. In most provinces, there was-and is-only a
single law school (two at most) rather closely identified with the provincial
professional body. Full-time legal education became universal in Canada
after World War II, largely as a result of pressure from within the academic
community striving to improve standards, rather than (as has been suggested in the United States) (Auerbach, 1976) as a result of professional
attempts to preclude entry by unwanted minorities (Bucknall et al., 1968;
Laskin, 1983). There is no obvious national hierarchy of schools, however,
although some are favored by geographic location or historical circumstance (Adam & Lahey, 1981: 685). Most students attend law school in
their home province or in the nearest province with a law school and, once
called to the bar, rarely move to another province to practice law (see table
4). There is, therefore, no Canadian counterpart to the American elite law
schools, whose graduates may clearly be identified by their social backgrounds or professional careers.

AGE

Because various Canadian provinces offer eleven, twelve, or thirteen years
of primary and secondary education and because various jurisdictions
require from two to four years of prelaw university education, the age for
beginning law studies varies considerably. Every province requires a threeyear law degree, however, together with some period of service under
articles (apprenticeship). In addition, most provinces require systematic
practical instruction in law, either contemporaneous with, before, or after
articling: The minimum age for entry to practice thus is between twentyfour and twenty-seven. Indeed, since most law students have at least a first
degree in some other field, many have pursued graduate studies in other
disciplines or other careers, and some undertake graduate studies in law
before entering practice, the actual age of entry is much higher than the
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minimum (McKennirey, 1983: 124; Levy, 1972: 12, 23-25; Huxter, 1981).
Still, the rapid growth of the profession recently has rendered it much
more youthful (see table 5).

GENDER

Although Canada was the first country in the British Empire to admit
women to legal practice (in 1896) (Harvey, 1970), the number of women in
law school remained minuscule until about 1970. Women now constitute
35 percent of new entrants in most jurisdictions (Berger, 1979; Zemans,
1986: 20-21; McKennirey, 1983: 3) and 15 percent of all lawyers (see
table 6).
As a result of conscious effort, women have been appointed in increasing numbers to law faculties, boards, commissions, and courts (including
the Supreme Court of Canada, which now has its first female puisne judge).
They rose from 4.4 percent of full-time law teachers in 1971/72 to 14.2
percent in 1982/83; however, they still are not well represented in the elite
of the legal profession (Guppy & Siltanen, 1977; Huxter, 1981; Adam,
1981). Male judges and magistrates outnumbered female by more than
eight to one in 1981-more than nineteen to one on the federal bench.
Nor are women found in proportionate numbers in all types of practices.

ETHNICITY

There is a clear preponderance in the legal profession of members of the
well-established charter groups: French Catholics in Quebec and English
Protestants in the rest of Canada (Adam & Lahey, 1971; Arthurs et al.,
1971: 500 ff.; Cadres Professionels, Inc., 1968). Some of the more established immigrant groups have managed to achieve significant representation within the profession on a local or regional basis, however,
sometimes far in excess of their numbers within the general populationEnglish Protestants in Montreal and Jews in several metropolitan centers.
Children of newer immigrant groups, such as Italians and Ukrainians, also
are beginning to appear in discernible numbers. Some of the most recent
arrivals, such as West Indians and Asians, Portuguese and Greeks, still are
significantly underrepresented, and despite conscious efforts to recruit and
support native law students, their numbers remain very small (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1981). Students from nonmetropolitan areas doubtless end up practicing law in the largest cities,
while relatively few seem to migrate in the opposite direction.
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CLASS

Historically, law has claimed to be an "open profession." Indeed, one of its
functions (reflected in the early requirements) may have been the recruitment, socialization, and certification of members of an incipient "new
upper class" of considerable importance in colonial society (Baker, 1983;
Smith & Tepperman, 1974).
For at least the past generation, however, entry into the legal profession, and especially access to its most prestigious positions, has been
enjoyed disproportionately by individuals from professional families and
other privileged socioeconomic groups (Arthurs et al., 1971; Levy, 1972;
Lajoie aI).d Parizeau, 1976; Adam & Lahey, 1981). Indeed, entry into the
professions generally, and into other elites, has not been significantly
democratized, largely because recent immigrant groups, the poor, and
other disadvantaged minorities have been unable to overcome educational
and financial barriers (Clement, 1975b; Porter, 1965; Newman, 1975).
These barriers have been raised by increasing competition to enter law
school since the 1960s and by the more recent downturn in the °Canadian
economy. Individuals from disadvantaged circumstances are found in
diminishing numbers as one ascends the educational ladder (Porter, 1979;
Cuneo & Curtis, 1975). Costs have risen as well: law school fees ranged
from Can$340 to Can$625 in 1966/67 but were between Can$808 and
Can$1,615 in 1984/85.
Many law schools have sought to admit mature students who have not
attended university, native peoples, and other qualified individuals whose
credentials may have been adversely affected by social or economic circumstances (McKennirey, 1983 ). Within the profession, meritocratic criteria have enabled some highly qualified individuals to attain legal positions
from which they previously would have been excluded.

STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE PROFESSION

White Anglo-Saxon Protestant males are overrepresented in large corporate law firms, not only in English Canada but also in the predominately
French city of Montreal, and Jews, Catholics, members of ethnic minorities,
and women are underrepresented (Adam & Lahey, 1981; Arthurs et al.,
1971: 51°6-518). There is a tendency toward ghettoization, however, especially within the "household sector" of legal practice. ''Ethnics," particularly Jews, have tended disproportionately to practice in such areas as
criminal law, real estate, service to small businesses, and domestic relations
(Colvin et al., 1978; Arthurs et al., 1971: 512- 513, 517).
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STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
HISTORY
The history of the legal profession differs considerably from province to
province; the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec is the most obvious special
case (Lortie, 1975; Sinclair, 1975; Lachance, 1966; Buchanan, 1925). During
the early period most of the very few lawyers were foreign trained. Some
came directly from the United Kingdom, some were loyalist ernigres from
postrevolutionary America, and others (especially judges and law officers)
served in Canada before or after other colonial postings (Parker, J 982;
MacAlister, 1928; Riddell, 1928).
In the older colonies such as Nova Scotia and Upper Canada (Ontario),
local professional bodies soon assumed regulatory functions in imitation of
the English Inns of Court, acting sometimes under statutory mandate and
sometimes under executive control and direction Uohnston, 1972; Sm'i.th,
1948; Riddell, 1928; MacAlister, 1928). When there were few trained
lawyers available, a considerable amount of legal business was conducted
by nonqualified functionaries such as conveyancers and notaries (Gibson &
Gibson, 1972). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the profession gradually asserted its monopoly (Newman, 1974; Orkin, 1971;
Hawkins, 1978; Cole, 1983). Yet as late as the midtwentieth century,
lay magistrates were being appointed in Ontario, the most heavily urbanized and legally most advanced of the common law jurisdictions.
The professional body in each province, often called the "Law Society,"
exercised licensing functions, set standards of admission and professional
conduct, and disciplined misconduct. It also retained active control of legal
education until the late nineteenth century and dominated it thereafter by
the joint or sole proprietorship of law schools, specification of formal
educational requirements, and informal articulation of what lawyers ought
to know" (Bucknall et al., 1968; Laskin, 1983; Baker, 1983: 68).
The "numbers problem" first surfaced in the 1830s and 1840s, when
lawyers and others complained about overproduction in Upper Canada.
Until the midnineteenth century, law was a relatively "open" profession,
in which lax standards of entry (several years of apprenticeship) posed
no serious obstacles. Thereafter, more rigorous educational requirements
alternated with periods of relative (even total) laxity, reflecting divergent views about whether the Law Society should pursue its project of
professional socialization through formal or informal, centralized or decentralized, training schemes.
From the end of the nineteenth century, Law Societies (outside Ontario)
exhibited declining interest in legal education. In many jurisdictions they
gradually ceded to the universities responsibility for formal instruction in
/1
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law, but everywhere they retained control over entry through a required
period of apprenticeship. These changing educational requirements had,
and sometimes were perceived to have had, an adverse impact on access to
the profession by poor students, those from outlying areas, and foreign
lawyers who had emigrated to Canada (Baker, 1983; Bucknall et al., 1968).
During the Great Depression this impact was considerable, especially since
it-coincided with the general impoverishment of universities.
In the years following World War II, however, provincial law societies
have been involved only marginally in providing basic legal education
(Laskin, 1983: 153; Arnup, 1982; Bucknall et al., 1968). Today, professional
associations focus on three matters: (1) "practical" ·professional education
immediately prior to admission and on a continuing basis thereafter; (2)
regulatory functions, especially those connected with the protection of
client funds and other aspects of lawyer honesty and, to a lesser extent,
those directed toward maintaining intraprofessional relations; and (3) public functions, including the management of legal aid schemes, dissemination of public information about law, protection of the professional monopoly, and lobbying on behalf of the legal profession.

THE SCOPE OF PRACTICE

The right to define the scope of practice is no less valuable a prerogative in
protecting the professional monopoly than is the regulation of entry. The
Canadian legal profession uses the same device as its counterpart in the
·United States, namely, statutory provisions against unauthorized practice.
Until recently, the clear trend has been to extend the jurisdictional claims
of lawyers across a wide spectrum of practice situations-from advocacy
to the preparation of documents intended to have legal effect and ultimately to legal advice (Davies, 1952: 25; Orkin, 1957: 248-253; see, e.g.,
Law Society Act, Rev. Stat. Manitoba 1970, c. Ll00.5.48 [2] [7]. The fad
that most statutes permit people to ad on their own behalf or as unremunerated agents does little to dispel the suspicion that restrictions on
practice have less to do with protecting consumers than with protecting
markets.
Certain exemptions or limited rights to "practice" have been granted,
explicitly or by acquiescence, to occupations that could not function if the
statutory provisions were enforced literally. Some provinces exempt insurance claims adjusters and real estate agents as long as they function within
narrowly defined limits; others allow public officials to draft legal documents (e.g., Legal Profession Ad, Rev. Stat. Alberta 1980, c. L-9, s. 93 [2]
[a]; Barristers and Solicitors Ad, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26,
s. I; see Colvin et al., 1978). Provinciai statutes authorize the appearance of
"agents" before small claims cou_rts and administrative agencies (e.g., Statu-
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tory Powers Procedures Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 484; Rules of the
Provincial Court, Ontario Leg. 797/ 84). And federal legislation allows lay
representati<,m in minor criminal matters (Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. Can.
1970, c. C-34 s. 735). Rights of audience are widely exercised by trade
union officials before labor boards, accountants before taxation tribunals,
and more generally by law clerks and articled students (apprentices) employed by law firms.
In "gray areas" that the monopoly does not clearly reach, explicit
jurisdictional understandings ensure due regard for professional interests.
Trust companies thus are allowed to draw wills, provided they are "reviewed" by private practitioners, and community clinics may dispense
legal advice and service in less important matters through law students and
lay advocates, if significant remunerative work is forwarded to qualified
private practitioners.
Judicial interpretation of jurisdictional statutes also has tended to enlarge the protected scope of professional practice. The preparation of
papers for probate, the drawing of wills, the drafting of legal documents by
a collection agency, applications for incorporation, and the processing of
uncontested divorces all have been designated "unauthorized practice"
when performed for gain by a nonlawyer, even in the absence of compelling statutory language (e.g., R. v. Engel and Seaway Divorcing Service
(1974], 11 0.R. [2d] 343). A recent ruling appears to set some limits on the
legal monopoly, however, by requiring that activities be reserved to
lawyers only if it can be demonstrated that the public otherwise would be
placed at risk (R. v. Nicholson (1979], 96 D.L.R. [3d] 693 [Alta. C.A.]).
Legal action against "unauthorized practice" typically is initiated by law
societies, which usually intervene at the request of a member. There is
some indication that the adverse market conditions of the late 1970s and
early 1980s are reflected in an increasing number of complaints received
by the unauthorized practice committees of professional bodies. In Ontario, for example, ten to sixteen complaints were received annually between 1968 and 1973; during the next eight years this increased to thirtyfive to ninety per year (Professional Orgnaizations Committee, 1980: 242).
It should be noted that most complaints are either diverted or negotiated.
Very few lead to actual prosecution. Because of the transparent element of
professional self-interest, an Ontario commission recently recommended
that no prosecution for unauthorized practice be commenced except with
the written consent of the attorney general of the province (ibid.).

PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNT ABILITY

Despite the success of provincial Law Societies in dominating the market
for legal services, the professional hegemony of Canadian lawyers has not
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gone entirely unchallenged. Both the demand from professional groups
that provincial legislatures mediate jurisdictional disputes and attempts
by several occupational associations to secure certification or licensure
regimes have caused governments to reevaluate their policies toward the
professions in general. Moreover, governments have been increasingly
responsive to appeals from consumer groups for greater accountability by
the professions. Although public debate has focused on the organization
and financing of the health occupations, the position of the bar in the
division of labor also has been examined by several governmental commissions and inquiries over the past fifteen year~ (Royal Commission
Inquiry into Civil Rights, 1968; Commission of Inquiry on Health and
Social Welfare, 1970; Economic Council of Canada, 1969; Professional
Organizations Committee, 1980).
No province has gone further than Quebec in modifying the relationship between the state and the professions. In 1973, several years after a
provincial Royal Commission spoke extensively to the issues, Quebec
enacted a Professional Code, which formally expanded public control over
all professional groups, including the bar, far beyond the controls prevailing in other provinces (Stat. Quebec 1973, c. 43). The central innovation is
the organization of all professions into corporations with parallel mandates
and the subordination of these corporations to an overarching provincial
Professions Board, all of whose members belong to some profession but
are appointed by the provincial cabinet. The board ensures that each
profession fulfills its statutory obligations, approves regulations proposed
by the professions, including fee schedules, and publishes decisions in
disciplinary cases. A provincial Professions Tribunal hears appeals from the
disciplinary tribunal of each body. Although other provinces have rejected
these changes on the ground that they threaten the independence of the
bar, there is little to justify this fear (lssalys, 1978; Pepin, 1979; Arthurs,
1982).

A much more typical response to demands for professional accountability has been to leave the bar's historic governing structures essentially
intact while engrafting additional elements designed to provide the public
symbolic reassurance but no real control (Arthurs, 1982). The experience
of Ontario is instructive (Arthurs, 1971). Responding to the recommendations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry, the Ontario legislature in 1970
created a "Law Society Council," composed of representatives of the
profession's governing body and other legal "estates" as well as some
public members and charged with reporting to the legislature annually
about how the profession discharged its public responsibilities. Lacking a
fixed agenda, its own secretariat, and public members with identifiable
constituencies, the council soon ceased to function. Jn its place, the legislature mandated the direct appointment of four lay members to the govern-
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ing body (about 10 percent of its membership). Hostages to fortune, and
no more influential than their individual exertions and talents dictate, these
lay members have largely deflected public demand for further state control of the profession without actually providing· any effective means of
enforcing public accountability. Similarly, a statutory admonition that the
provincial attorney general (an ex officio member of the governing body)
should serve as guardian of the public interest has had little practical result.
Lay membership of local and provincial legal aid committees does seem
to give some support and direction to attempts to provide legal services to
the poor. Public accountability seems to depend on episodic pressure from
a variety of external sources, however: a Royal Commission or legislative
committee investigating some aspect of professional practice or governance; newspaper editorials or legislative debates signaling concern with
the bar's policies; occasional threats of investigation or prosecution by
the combines (antitrust) authorities; or adverse comments on the behavior of lawyers or law societies by judges, in the course of litigation or
extrajudicially.
Given the relatively nonintrusive and sporadic nature of these criticisms
and demands for accountability, it is difficult to see much connection
between the profession's virtual obsession with "independence of the bar"
and any real threat. Rather, the shibboleth of independence is a central
premise of professional ideology, pronounced for internal consumption
more than to persuade an external audience.

REGULATION OF ENTRY

Except for a few local idiosyncracies concerning subject requirements,
everyone with a basic credential (LLB.) from any Canadian Law school
may complete the professional requirements for admission in any Canadian
jurisdiction (other than Quebec, which has a civil law system). For at least
twenty years, emphasis has been placed on the "portability" of law degrees among Canadian jurisdictions (Murray, 1979; Berger, 1979: 41), although this is subject to several practical restraints.
First, "portability" applies only at the moment of graduation from law
school. The interprovincial mobility of practitioners has been inhibited by
various measures designed to discourage either transfers or simultaneous
practice in several jurisdictions (Murray, 1979). The recent enactment of a
constitutional guarantee of "occupational mobility" (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, :>. 6[2]), however, coupled with the first appearance
of "interprovincial" law firms, may alter this position (Clarry, 1982).
Second, even though LLB. degrees are "portable" in principle, attempts
have been· made to encourage employers to fill articling positions with
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graduates from inside the province. These have been only partially successful because firms wish to hire the best available candidates.
Third, those without Canadian credentials obviously do not benefit
from this arrangement. Holders of foreign degrees find it very difficult to
requalify in Canada and almost always must complete further formal education, as well as professional training. The requirement that all entrants
possess Canadian citizenship recenHy was challenged unsuccessfully on
constitutional grounds (Re Skapinker [1984], 9 D.LR. [4th] 161; see Lenoir,
1981).
It might seem possible to control entry by regulating the number of
articling positions, and such restrictive practices may, indeed, exist in small
communities; however, most Law Societies have undertaken to secure
articles for all local graduates. Likewise, except for a few well-publicized
and atypical instances, Law Societies have not attempted to restrict entry
by ensuring artificially high failure rates on bar admission examinations
(Bowlby, 1982). The pass rate for the Law Society of Upper Canada's Bar
Admission Course was 98 percent in 1973 and 99 percent in both 1979
and 1985.
In general, then, entry into the profession is effectively determined by
the award of an LLB. degree. Indeed, because Canadian law schools have
a very low failure rate (due to the high entry standards) (Browning, 1976),
acceptance to an LLB. program virtually ensures ultimate admission to
practice.
Although professional bodies may exert influence on governments that
financially support university law programs, or even on the policies of law
faculties themselves, they do not ultimately control law school admissions .
Canadian law schools experienced very considerable growth from the mid1960s through the mid-1970s (see table 7; also Consultative Group on
Research and Education in Law, 1983: 25). Existing faculties expanded
greaHy, and new schools were opened. Nevertheless, law students constituted about the same proportion of postsecondary students at the end of
the period as at the beginning.
Factors inhibiting the further growth of law faculties lay largely outside
professional control. Law schools were reluctant to grow because of the
difficulties of recruiting and retaining teachers, unfavorable student-faculty
ratios, and inadequate financial suppdrt. Despite the fact that declining
birth rates might have been expected to reduce the number of applicants
for admission to law school by the early 1980s, fierce competition persists,
with the·ratio of applications to available places running between 5: 1 and
10 : 1 (see table 8).
The unanswered question, however, is the extent to which law schools
have internalized professional assumptions and values, unconsciously responding to the widespread desire of lawyers to limit growth during a
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period of economic contraction (Consultative Group in Research and Education in Law, 1983: 42). In Ontario, this desire was manifest in the response
to a 1981 survey conducted by the Law Society, in the creation in 1983 of
an Ontario Lawyers' Association overtly committed to limiting numbers,
and in the prolimitation rhetoric of most candidates seeking election to the
profession's governing body in the 1983 quadrennial election.
This pressure was resisted at several points, however. Professional governing bodies disclaimed authority to restrict numbers and, fea ring legal
and political repercussions, were reluctant to seek necessary statutory
changes. These governing bodies, moreover, generally are dominated by
established practitioners who are less exposed to fluctuations in the
economy and thus can afford the luxury of taking a principled stand in
favor of the play of market forces. Since the level of government support
for legal education is indirectly linked to enrollment, law faculties understandably are reluctant to consider entry controls.
In any event, restriction of entry is unlikely significantly to alleviate
economic problems within the profession in the absence of a strategy to
redeploy existing or future practitioners to areas of potential demand
(Stager, 1982: 134). The effect of market forces already is being felt. The
number of lawyers in private practice is growing more slowly, and many
new graduates (and some· established practitioners) have been diverted
into new areas of activity, such as legal aid (Berger, 1979: 18, 49, 50), and
especially into nonpractice roles in business, government, and elsewhere.
Between 1971 and 1982 the proportion of Ontario lawyers in private
practice declined from 86 percent to 71 percent (Law Society of Upper
Canada, 1983b: 227).

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Voluntary Organizations

Canadian Bar Association. This is the only national body of Canadian
lawyers. It is organized into provincial branches whose membership ranges
from the entire practicing bar in some provinces (as a result of compulsion)
to a rather lower level in Quebec (because notaries are excluded). The
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) performs many of its functions through
special sections organized around areas of professional practice such as labor
relations, estate planning, and taxation or around special interests such as
legal education. The function of these sections is largely educational but
also includes participation in law reform and the expression of views on
matters of public concern or professional interest. The CBA thus expended considerable effort and funds in recent national debates over
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constitutional changes (CBA, 1978). It also has adopted relatively liberal
resolutions on such matters as capital punishment, abortion, search and
seizure, and the rights of prisoners and the disabled; however, the CBA
regularly endorses modestly conservative positions on taxation and government regulation of the economy. Understandably, the organizational
behavior of the CBA and its ideology and formal public positions all seek
to advance professional interests and values, although pronouncements
often are couched in terms of public contribution and responsibility (Mackimmie, 1963).
In addition to these functions, the CBA traditionally has provided
important social links, although these probably are diminishing as the
profession expands, diversifies in functions, and stratifies in terms of social
background and economic rewards. More important, in recent years, have
been services to members, including insurance and pension schemes and
advice on law office management.

Local Lawyers' Clubs. Most communities in which lawyers practice have
at least one organization whose membership is open to all local practitioners. Almost all are devoted to parochial interests, such as social activities, seminars, and the provision of a local law library.
At least before recent amendments arguably made antitrust legislation
applicable to legal services (A.G. Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia
[1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]), it was quite common for local law
associations to adopt minimum fee tariffs for standard transactions and
services. In Ontario, 1 percent or 1.25 percent commonly was charged the
purchaser or the vendor for conveying a house. Such tariff arrangements
apparently still are enforced in small communities by social pressures.
Local organizations also may engage in restrictive practices, such as agreeing not to employ articling students in order to limit competition.
As the legality of these arrangements has been challenged (Henderson,
1977; Posluns, 1980), local law associations have turned from direct attempts to control prices to efforts to persuade provincial governing bodies
to restrict entry and to adopt legally binding fee tariffs, breach of which
would lead to disciplinary sanctions.
Professional Specialist Organizations. Organizations have been formed of
criminal lawyers, corporate counsel, Crown attorneys, advocates, and
other specialists. A few are national, such as the Canadian Association of
Law Teachers. One or two embrace a broad spectrum of lawyers, such as
the "Osgoode Society" (for legal history). Other groups set ambitious
goals, such as the Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia,
which pursues its mandate on behalf of the provincial branch of the Bar
Association, the Law Society, and the law faculties.
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Special Constituencies within the Profession. There are a number of relatively small organizations uniting lawyers on the basis of characteristics
other than common professional interests. The Women's Law Association
is an older organization; Women and Law is a younger grouping of
feminists (lawyers and laypersons) concerned about both the role of
women within the profession and the impact of law on women. The Thomas
More Lawyers' Guild contains Catholic lawyers, and there are organizations of Jewish lawyers and of members of other religious or ethnic
groups, such as native peoples. The Law Union contains progressive
lawyers and other legal workers (Martin, 1985). At the other end of the
spectrum is the recently founded Ontario Lawyers' Association, which
might be described as a right-wing grass-roots organization.
Quasipublic Professional Bodies
A number of bodies operate under the joint auspices of the legal profession
and the government. Three examples illustrate their range of interests. The
Canadian Law Information Council (CLIC) promotes computerized data
retrieval, assesses the knowledge needed by the profession, and educates
the public about law. The Canadian Institute for the Administration of
Justice (CIA)) organizes conferences and stimulates research on the cost of
justice and the organization of the judiciary.
Since 19'70, legislation in almost all Canadian provinces has required
that interest on lawyers' trust accounts (see table 9) be paid to a "law
foundation" for public purposes (which obviously benefit the profession as
well), such as law libraries, legal research and education, public legal education, and legal aid.

Compulsory Organizations
Everyone practicing law must belong to the provincial law society. Termination or suspension of membership terminates or suspends the right to
practice. Practicing law without membership is an offense.
The governing body is controlled by an elected executive, whose members generally are called "benchers." Older lawyers, those practicing in
cities, members of large, prestigious firms, and leading civil and criminal
advocates are overrepresented in these bodies, whereas rank-and-file practitioners; women; and lawyers employed by government, universities, or
corporations tend to be underrepresented (Orkin, 1971: 116- 124; see
tables 10, 11, this chapter). Except in Ontario, however, where elections
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are at large, the governing body is elected from defined geographic constituencies and, therefore, may be relatively dose to the views of most
practitioners; minority and dissident viewpoints seldom are represented.
The clublike character of governing bodies is reflected in their relatively
restrained behavior. There is some virtue in their passivity. For example,
with one notable exception (Re Legal Profession Act, Re Martin [1949],
D.L.R. 106 [B.C. Law Soc.], aff'd [1950], 3 D.L.R. 173 [B.C.C.A.]), the
Canadian legal profession avoided attempts to enforce ideological conformity, even during the most intense period of the cold war. Indeed,
leaders of the bar defended those accused during the notorious "spy trials"
in the late 1940s. An air of "noblesse oblige" still often characterizes the
official positions of law societies on public policy issues (Chadwick, 1981);
however, members have little opportunity to influence the policies of the
governing body. The annual meeting usually is proforma, and members
can express their views on the decisions taken by their representatives
only through elections.
Governing bodies still do respond to pressure from voluntary organizations. For example, provincial law societies and provincial CBA branches
compete or cooperate in the area of continuing legal education. Organizations of defense counsel may affect the rules of professional conduct.
In addition, local law associations may shape decisions relating to the
establishment of legal clinics.
Because the provincial law societies exercise delegated statutory powers
and collaborate with government in legal aid and law reform, leaders of the
profession seek to avoid political controversy (Giffen, 1961; Orkin, 1971).
While considerable attention recently was devoted to fending off an inquiry by the Province of Ontario into professional governance (Professional Organizations Committee, 1980), the Law Society simultaneously responded to well-founded concerns about its disciplinary system.
In general, the governing bodies of the Canadian legal profession have
been fairly astute politically. They have perceived that there is more to be
gained by cooperating with government than by opposing it. For example,
the profession's governing body supported the establishment of a Legal
Aid Plan in Ontario, despite some rank-and-file skepticism, with the result
that the Law Society was given responsibility for administering the
scheme. Similarly, the professionally-administered plan accommodated
criticism of the fee-for-service aspects by funding community-based clinics.
Law societies have hewed rather carefully to the line that their primary
functions are to regulate admissions, standards of conduct, and (recently)
competence (Thom, 1974). Admissions committees in most Canadian
provinces have been relatively lax in scrutinizing the nonacademic credentials of applicants, refusing to deny entry for minor drug convictions
and other offenses connected with adolescent crises or student culture. In
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one recent unusual case, a lawyer convicted of a criminal offense involving
egregious sexual misconduct with minors was disbarred (ibid.); a similar
fate befell a lawyer implicated in the theft of valuable securities (Novalc v.
Law Society of British Columbia [1972], 31 D.L.R. [3d] 89 [B.C.S.C.]). It is
relatively rare that anyone is disbarred except for dishonesty or other
misconduct directly connected with professional functions, however. Of
those disbarred in Ontario between 1945 and 1965, 83 percent improperly
used client funds, 6 percent committed other fraud or forgery, and 8
percent neglected client affairs (Arthurs, 1970).

SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONAL CONTROL: CODES OF ETHICS

Provincial governing bodies have statutory power to discipline their members for "conduct unbecoming a barrister or solicitor" or "unprofessional
conduct" (e.g., Law Society Ad, Rev. Stat. Ont. 1980, c. 233, s. 34). In
some jurisdictions, these vague standards are made more precise by additional statutory language (e.g., Barristers and Solicitors Ad, Rev. Stat.
British Columbia 1979, c. 26, s. 50) or, more frequently, by regulations
(subordinate legislation) adopted subject to the approval of the provincial
cabinet (and, in Quebec, of the Professional Council) (Professions Code,
Rev. Stat. Quebec 1977, c. c-26, ss. 12, 13, 94, 95). Ontario, for example,
regulates the handling of trust funds very extensively (Law Society Ad,
Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, s. 63; Rev. Reg. Ont. 1980, Reg. 573).
Most provinces have also adopted professional conduct rules (Law
Society of Upper Canada, l 983c), which are treated as guidelines rather
than binding codes by bodies responsible for discipline. These codes generally were inspired by those adopted by the CBA (1920; 1974). The 1920
CBA Code was extremely vague (having been modeled on a contemporary American Bar Association document) and did not respond to the
changing nature of legal practice for the next half century. Never amended
and seldom referred to in disciplinary proceedings or even hortatory
discussions of professional ethics, it remained a well-kept secret.
By contrast, the 1974 code was well publicized, formally adopted in
most provinces, and more influential in both disciplinary proceedings and
discussions of appropriate standards of professional conduct. Yet it, too,
is overly vague and insufficiently rooted in reality. The code appears to
adopt the perspective of the client and the public. For example, restrictions
on advertising-for clearly anticompetitive purposes-are contained in a
rule entitled "Making Legal Services Available" and couched in terms of
the desire to avoid either burdening the public with the cost of advertising
or misleading the public.
Disciplinary enforcement is preoccupied with ensuring the honesty of
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lawyers (Arthurs, 1970). Regulations prescribe methods of accounting for
client funds; all law societies conduct regular audits, and some engage in
"spot audits"- there were 864 in Ontario in 1984. Noncompliance with
these rules, even when one is negligent rather than dishonest, generally
leads to discipline. Dishonesty is almost certain to result in disbarment,
except when there are unusual mitigating circumstances, such as mental
problems or personal tragedies. Victims of lawyer dishonesty receive payments (generally within high but fixed limits) from a compensation fund
to which all lawyers must contribute. Payments in Ontario rose from
Can$737,000 for 88 claims in 1981 to Can$1,182,000 for 216 claims in
1984 (Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports).
Lawyers almost never are disciplined except when the public is injured
by fraud, perjutry, or some other criminal ad (Arthurs, 1970; see also table
12, this chapter). Between 1966 and 1979 the number of complaints rose in
Ontario, but the number of disbarments remained constant at approximately four a year; since then it has risen to twelve in 1980, nineteen in
1981, twenty-five in 1982, and twenty-one in 1984 (Law Society of Upper
Canada, Annual Reports). Otherwise, the disciplinary process is used to
enforce professional interests only in a few high-profile cases when the
authority of the Law Society is challenged. For example, a recent wellpublicized and extensive advertising campaign by a lawyer evoked the
threat of disciplinary sanctions and stimulated extensive litigation before
leading to relaxation of the rules (Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia
(1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]).
Informal enforcement processes may influence professional behavior,
however; these processes include investigations by the law society and
threats to investigate, informal admonitions or formal warnings by the
governing body, and social and economic sanctions by formal and informal local lawyer groups. Such informal processes generally are directed
toward either matters of intraprofessional concern or minor infractions
relating to public behavior or service to clients.
Self-regulation is least satisfactory in ensuring competence (Hurlburt,
1979). While there is a great deal of exhortation and a certain amount of
education, there has been very little enforcement of quality standards by
means of systematic or random testing. Indeed, until the adoption of the
new CBA Code of Professional Conduct (rule 2) in 1974, incompetence
was not explicitly declared to be unacceptable. As a consequence, the few
lawyers who have been disbarred for incompetence are those who have
suffered a virtually total collapse of personality and become unable to
carry on their practice; in such cases, removal from practice is viewed as
nondisciplinary.
Recently, however, the provincial bars have sought to reassure the
public by requiring lawyers to carry "errors and omissions" insurance.
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Within a few years after its introduction, claims- and hence premiumsbegan to mount (see table 13), especially in real estate practices (see table
14). This engendered considerable concern and led to the development of
three. strategies designed to enhance competence, .thereby reducing both
claims and premiums (Swan, 1982; Hurlburt, 1979): (1) programs of continuing legal education and "claims control" have been instituted (Gold,
1972: 23), (2) rehabilitative programs assist lawyers whose practices appear
to be falling below an acceptable standard (Marshall, 1980), and (3) proper
standards of practice are encouraged by experience rating of insurance
premiums (in Ontario, rates varied between Can$825 and Can$3,300 in
1983/84).
Victims of incompetence also may sue lawyers for damages (Belobaba,
1978; Pritchard, 1978), and judgments appear to be increasing in number
and size. Finally, a judge may intervene when an advocate performs incompetently, although this remains exceptional (Re Solicitor [1971], 1 Ont. Rep.
138).
Specialization has been increasing, at least in larger urban centers (Arthurs et al., 1971; Esau, 1979; Colvin et al., 1978; Colvin, 1979). Nevertheless, clients still encounter difficulty finding lawyers who can provide
competent service even in such prosaic household "specialties" as criminal
law, family law, or civil litigation (Trebilcock & Reiter, 1982). Proposals to
certify specialists, thereby ensuring their competence and enhancing their
visibility to clients, were adopted in principle by the CBA in 1983; however, the law societies remain adamantly opposed to both formal certification and systems of self-designation. Instead, the profession has attacked
those who "advertise" their specialty and thereby seek competitive advantage (Professional Organizations Committee, 1980).

SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONAL CONTROL: PROCEDURES AND
INSTITUTIONS

If a complaint against a lawyer progresses beyond the stage of informal
discussion, the disciplinary committee conducts a formal hearing, prosecuted by the Law Society staff or special counsel. The committee's decision often is subject to approval by, or appeal to, the full governing body
(e.g., Law Society Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 233, ss. 33, 34, 39). The
committee can reprimand, limit the right to practice, suspend, or disbar.
Some law societies also have the power to impose financial penalties (e.g.,
Barristers and Solicitors Act, Rev. Stat. British Columbia 1979, c. 26,
s. 51(1]) and to suspend those suffering from physical or mental illness,
while managing their practices to protect client assets and interests. The
sanctioned .lawyer (but not the complainant) can seek judicial review of
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legal or procedural errors; however, judges are reluctant to retry facts or
review penalties absent egregious injustice (Prescott v. Law Society of British
Columbia [1971], 19 D.L.R. [3d] 446 fB.C.C.A]).
The profession thus controls both the prosecution and adjudication of
misconduct. There is no provision for a "lay observer" or any other lay
participation in the disciplinary process, except for the involvement of lay
benchers, if any. Moreover, since most dishonest lawyers are bankrupt,
clients can only seek ex gratia payments from the profession's compen1
sation fund.

EDUCATION, SOCIALIZATION, AND ALLOCATION
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

I
t

I
l
j
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For most of the nineteenth century, and through the first half of the
twentieth in some provinces (including Ontario, the largest common law
jurisdiction), appre_µticeship was the primary means by which Canadian
lawyers were educated. Full-time law schools began to appear about 1880,
but both the University of Montreal (1878) and Dalhousie University law
faculties (1883) had minuscule professorial complements until after 1945,
depending largely on part-time lecturers from the bench and the bar. A
similar situation prevailed at the Universities of Saskatchewan and Alberta.
Elsewhere, provincial law societies opened their own law schools-alone
or in collaboration with universities-again primarily using practitioners
as teachers (Bucknall et al., 1968; Baker, 1983; see also table 15, this
chapter). When A. Z. Reed completed his classic study of legal education
in Canada and the United States in 1928, therefore, it was clear that the
Canadian legal profession enjoyed even more control over the production
of lawyers than did its U.S. counterpart (Reed, 1928: 530).
By 1925, seven out of nine provinces required at least two years of
college before entry to law school, and the others required some postsecondary study. All provinces required at least three years of legal
studies, and four required attendance at local law schools. All required a
period of office work and a final examination (Reed, 1925: 3; see also table
16, this chapter).
Although some law schools (including the largest common law school,
Osgoode Hall in Ontario) were operated by the legal profession itself,
some by a university, and some jointly by a university and the local bar,
these alternatives were neither conflictual nor competitive; they merely
coexisted, each reigning supreme in a particular province. Moreover, all
schools had agreed on a common curriculum proposed by the CBA in the
early 1920s (Reed, 1928: 203). Finally, the development of academic educa-
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tion was inhibited by the sheer lack of full-time instructors: there were no
more than sixteen full-time law teachers in all of Canada in 1928 (Reed,
1928: 373; Bucknall et al., 1968; Baker, 1983). It is no wonder, then, that
the same assumptions that led Reed to propose. a dual system of legal
education in the United States persuaded him to recommend a uniform
system of legal education in Canada.
The bar's monopoly over aU phases of the production of lawyers lasted
until the 1950s, when the university law faculties gradually claimed increasing authority over legal education. In 1957, under pressure from the
academic community, Canada's l(\rgest legal professional body, the Law
Society of Upper Canada (Ontario), negotiated a new arrangement with
the universities giving the professoriat ultimate responsibility for the LL.B.
curriculum (Amup, 1982; Bucknall et al., 1968). In 1968 the Law Society
transferred its own law school to York University (Arthurs, 1967). Similar
developments in other provinces during the 1950s and 1960s, coupled
with the rapid proliferation and expansion of law faculties, assured the
universities their present dominance of legal education, but they seemed
unprepared to assume the responsibility. As late as 1950, there were only
about 40 full-time law teachers in all of Canada; fewer than 100 were
added in the next decade. By 1970, however, numbers had tripled to about
450, and by 1980 they stood at 650. Between 1960 and 1980 there was
considerable innovation in curriculum, teaching methods, and modes of
research, sometimes engendering expressions of professional concern
(MacDonald, 1979; Veitch, 1979; Maclaren, 1974). At no time, however,
did law schools challenge the profession's ideology or intellectual capital
(McKennirey, 1983: 118; Consultative Group on Education and Research
in Law, 1983). In addition, the provincial law societies continued to control
the professional training phase, which generally includes a period of apprenticeship and formal instruction in various adjectival and practical matters, as well as skills training.

LEGAL EDUCATION AS A STRATEGY OF SOCIALJZATION AND
ALLOCATION

There is no scholarly tradition in Canadian law to challenge professional
priorities. The strategy of the law schools has been to stand at a distance
from the profession, sometimes through a scholastic concern with doctrinal
analysis and sometimes through a robust critique of professional knowledge and ideology. At the same time, academics seek to be perceived as
highly "professional" without being involved in, or even considering, all
the activities of practicing lawyers. Legal education projects an artificial and
misshapen representation of legal reality, rather like Durer' s rhinoceros.
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Law schools try to socialize students to an academic model of legal
practice and social reality. Although the attempt largely fails, the profession lavishes considerable energy on resocializing students to professional attitudes and values through articling and the bar admission
courses and also through indoctrination of new graduates. Moreover, the
bar has a valuable ally: the majority of law students, who tend to identify
with what they imagine to be the professional project.
There are few exceptions to these generalizations. The University of
Quebec at Montreal deliberately embarked on an alternative vision of
legal education, emphasizing its social dimension and expressing overt
antagonism toward professional elitism (Mackay, i 979). Recently founded
law schools in Calgary and Victoria made important pedagogic innovations. McGill, Ottawa, and Moncton all have responded to the bilingual
and bisystemic nature of Canadian law. Several schools are committed to
clinical legal education. Interdisciplinary studies, even joint degrees in law
and some other field (typically business), have become available in most
law schools. Students seize these varied opportunities relatively rarely,
however, and the innovations affect the margins rather than the "professional" mainstream of LLB. studies.
Professional control of entry to practice, coupled with professional
administration of articling and bar admission courses, discouraged the
emergence of private, entrepreneurial "cram" schools. Nothing ensured
that the profession's own educational programs would maintain high standards (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1972). For example, articling is
regarded as essentially a matter between student and principal. Law
societies do exhort both to pursue the objectives of articling, but there is
virtually no quality control. Teaching is a sideline for the articling principal, who is primarily (and sometimes totally) preoccupied with the service of clients. Students are likely either to be passive observers or to
perform delegated tasks-at best of legal research and drafting, at worst
of mere logistical support. The functions of an articling student seldom
relate directly to the practical business of interviewing, advocacy, or
negotiation. This may explain why articling is regarded as paid employment (although salaries are well below market rates for newly admitted
lawyers).
Articling has acquired a secondary importance as an entree to future
jobs, however. Large law firms use articling as a screening device to
identify junior lawyers who may be hired on their call to the bar. Small law
firms rrtay use articling stud~nts to cope with their work loads, selecting
occasional recruits when additional business warrants expansion. This is
not automatic: a I 980 study revealed that 66 percent of students did not
return to work at the firm where they articled, and more than 40 percent
had not found any job by the end of the six-month bar admission course
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that follows the articling year in Ontario (Huxter, 1981: 18}. Nevertheless,
students compete energetically for articling jobs (ibid.). The prestige, income, and work quality offered by large law firms makes them the first
choice of many (see table 17). While these firms historically tended to
recruit primarily on the basis of the "old school tie," now they emphasize
academic credentials. This reflects the need for able students and juniors to
handle sophisticated legal work, the diminishing acceptability of discrimination, and the growing economic power of various minority 'groups who
are more likely to take their legal business to law firms that hire their best
young members.
Large firms have little tolerance for idiosyncratic personal behavior,
political views, or lifestyles. As a result, a few "ethnic" law firms have
emerged, which sometimes deliberately dilute their parochial character by
adding members of other groups. More recently, too, some "political" leftwing lawyers have formed firms or adopted space-sharing arrangements.
Lawyers tend to remain in the practice seWng that they enter during
articles or on their first jobs, although large law firms weed out some
recruits after a probationary period, some small firms amalgamate with
each other or with large firms, and a few individual practitioners change
their practices becaus~ of either unusual success or failure (Adam & Lahey,
1981; Huxter, 1981; Berger, 1979; Colvin et al., 1978: 101).

DIVISION AND STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
I

1.

THE MYTH OF A SINGLE LEGAL PROFESSION

The Canadian legal profession clings strongly to the notion that all its
members engage in a common activity, share common attitudes, pursue
common interests, and participate equally in the common enterprise of
delivering legal services to the public. There is merely a single professional
credential earned in a single fashion in each jurisdiction (except Quebec,
with its Chambre des Notaires), a. single provincial professional organization,
no formal recognition of specialties or distinctive ethical codes for those
who pursue them, and only loose, voluntary organizations of lawyers
distinguished by special roles or interests.
The myth is patently at odds with the fads, however. Within the
profession, there is a clear division of .labor, clientele, and rewards (see
table 18). Moreover, both the profession and the public accord differentfal
respect and recognition to individuals and practice roles.
Why, then, does the profession insist so vigorously on its unity and
homogeneity? We propose three possible explanations: (1) there is a
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dearth of "hard" facts about Canadian lawyers and very little self-scrutiny
by the profession, (2) the myth of professional unity helps to reinforce
existing hierarchies by making them less visible, and (3) a unified profession can better protect its autonomy and influence public and governmental opinion than one that speaks with many voices.

"ELITE" LAW FIRMS

t
J

I

Elite law firms in Canada tend to resemble those in the United States (albeit
on a somewhat reduced scale and with some distinctive Canadian touches)
as a result of commonalities in their work, clientele, recruitment, and
organization. Indeed, they share some multinational clients, are involved in
transactions stretching across national boundaries, belong to international
legal organizations, derive their legal knowledge from common sources,
and occasionally are linked by international partnerships or networks of
law firms.
Elite firms contain between 25 and 200 lawyers. In 1971, 10 percent of
all firms earned almost half of all fees, while half of all firms earned only 14
percent (Statistics Canada, 1971). In 1985, 10 firms had more than 100
lawyers, and another 15 had between 50 and 100 (Canadian Law List,
1985). Although most operate from a single office found in the business or
financial district of a large city (see table 19), a few now have branches
abroad, while others are expanding on a multicity or interprovincial basis,
despite local protectionism (Black v. Law Society of Alta. [1985], 5 West
Wkly Rep. 284).
Elite law firms tend to be organized hierarchically. They employ a
number of articling students, from whom they often choose associates.
At the end of a probationary period associates either become partners or
leave (see table 20). Admission to partnership occasionally occurs as a result of merger with, or absorption of, another law firm or through lateral
movement.
Elite firms also depend heavily on office manage::-s, accountants, and
librarians, as well as large numbers of law clerks. Indeed, the number of
specialists and law clerks sometimes equals or exceeds the number of
professionally qualified lawyers (Taman, 1978; Colvin et al., 1978), and, of
course, every elite law firm will employ large numbers of highly skilled
secretaries and clerical personnel and invest heavily in office equipment
(CBA, 1985). A managing partner or management committee is responsible for making and administering personnel policy, overseeing the financial affairs of the firm, and defining its relationship to its clients and the
community at large.
Elite firms generally have significant corporate, tax, litigation, and con-
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veyancing departments and sometimes specialize in industrial property,
labor, transportation, and communications or estate planning as well (Colvin et al., 1978: 145). Certain lawyers may be identified as having a special
aptitude for legal research and tend to perform it for other members of the
firm. Senior partners may become preoccupied with the affairs of major
clients, whom they cultivate and advise on business strategies, governmental and community relations, and other matters that may not involve
the application of legal knowledge (Clement, 1975a; Gall, 1977; Porter,
1965; Newman, 1975). While many of these senior partners remain interested in "lawyers' law'' and counsel their junior colleagues, some have
"graduated" from the practice of law. Often it is partners in their forties
and fifties who perform the most sophisticated legal work, but some may
be drawn increasingly into the affairs of their corporate clients ~nd occasionally leave the firm permanently or temporarily to serve as senior
executives of major business organizations (Batten, 1980).
The financial lifeblood of the firm is the performance of legal services
for its ongoing clients-major business, financial, or governmental institutions (Batten, 1980; Clement, 1975a; Gall, 1977; Colvin, 1979). The
relationship of the elite firm to its clientele is further cemented by recruiting important individuals who have left politics or the public service and
seconding firm members to various governmental bodies. Specialist departments also attract clients, often referred by other lawyers. Fearing to
lose future referrals, firms take pains to ensure that the client is returned to
the referring lawyer upon completion of the task at harid. Elite firms also
may maintain a modest "household" practice, reflecting commitments that
antedate the firm's rise to eminence, catering to the legal needs of individuals employed by their corporate clients, and responding to partners'
. beliefs about their professional and community responsibilities.
Because their clients are mainly wealthy institutions, elite law firms are
able to charge very high fees and to compensate associates- and especially partners- accordingly (see table 21; Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980). Close
association with a corporate clientele also affords these lawyers unusual
opportunities to develop their own investments and business activities
(subject to professional conduct and "insider trading" rules) (Adam &
Lahey, 1981; Smith & Tepperman, 1974). Elite firm lawyers also enjoy the
opportunity to become involved in extremely sophisticated legal work
that demands, and generally elicits, a very high level of competence
(Batten, 1980). Also, because elite firms are large and hierarchically structured, they can allow members to become active in professional bodies,
community organizations, part-time law teaching, postgraduate study, or
political activity.
The very conditions that generate these rewards also exact a considerable price: Members may be particularly concerned to avoid conduct that
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might alienate clients. This produces an extreme commitment to meeting
deadlines, covering all eventualities, and avoiding technical errors. The
pace and intensity of professional work may well constrain the personal
lives of the lawyers. Moreover, because of the close relationship that often
develops between elite firm lawyers and their corporate clients, the
former-if not self-selected prior to joining the firm- subsequently may
be socialized in matters ranging from personal dress and deportment to
political perspectives.

METROPOLITAN MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS

~
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Medium-sized firms of ten to thirty lawyers often share many characteristics with the elite firms. Indeed, they often are either the remaining elite
firms of an earlier period, which have opted against significant growth, or
incipient elite firms, perhaps based on the merger of several small partnerships. Some, h owever, are organized around a small number of specialties
and do not purport to offer a complete line of legal services. The latter may
provide incomes that, while very generous, are considerably lower than
the extravagant professional and business incomes available in the elite
firms.
Medium-sized metropolitan firms often aggressively pursue both new
recruits and clients. Some have hired very able women and members of
minority groups, whereas others, for essentially the same reason, apparently have opted for impeccable social credentials in their recruitment.

SOLO PRACTITIONERS AND SMALL FIRMS IN METROPOLITAN
AREAS

The general practitioner is a central figure in the mythology. of the legal
profession. Solo practice and small partnerships were the most common
form of legal practice until after World War IL The trend toward larger
firms was evident by the 1950s (Nelligan, 1950, 1951), however, and it
accelerated thereafter. Solo practitioners declined from 43 percent of all
Ontario lawyers in 1950 to 21 percent in 1966 (Arthurs et al., 1971:
522- 523). By the 1970s, far fewer lawyers were practicing on their own or
in partnerships of two to five lawyers; however, the tendency toward
consolidation was halted, and possibly reversed, by recent economic conditions and the rapid growth of the profession. Established firms are expanding at a slower rate, and small and medium-sized firms are wary of
adding to their overheads by hiring new lawyers. For the first time in
many years, a significant number of able yoWlg graduates find themselves
in solo practice by default rather than by choice (Huxter, 1981: 177).
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Solo and small firm practitioners fall into three quite different groups.
First, there are the specialists (Arthurs et al., 1971: 507 ff.; Colvin et al.,
1978: 158), including some of the most highly regarded practitioners of
criminal and family law. Operating largely for noncorporate clients, these
specialists do not require the elaborate staffs and facilities characteristic of
the elite firms. Criminal defense counsel, especially, tend to reject the
paraphernalia of modern practice (Schumiatcher, 1979). Although an extensive (if imperfect) legal aid system exists, it is not unusual for leading
defense counsel to refuse to accept legally-aided clients, preferring to act
without charge in order to underline the traditional independence of the
bar and its service ethic. A few lawyers (many of them solo or small firm
practitioners) are heavily dependent on legal aid, however (see table 22).
A second category of smaH firm practitioners are lawyer-entrepreneurs.
A number of lawyers devote their energies to land assembly and mortgage
financing, especially during several protracted periods of real estate speculation. Despite their considerable economic success, entrepreneurial lawyers
seldom enjoy high repute within the profession. A disproportionately high
number of disbarments occurred within their ranks, perhaps because they
too readily accepted marketplace assumptions about relationships with
investors and partners, rather than the m~h more circumscribed fiduciary
role prescribed by codes of professional ethics (Arthurs, 1970).
In the shadow of economic difficulties, a number of young lawyers have
begun to try unconventional ways of providing legal services through
"law shops," charging lower fees in standardized matters, in franchised
offices in store fronts, department stores, or other unconventional settings.
Established lawyers have responded with hostility, invoking restrictions
on advertising in order to inhibit expansion (Re Klein and Law Society of
Upper Canada; Re Dvorak and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985], 16
D.L.R. [4th] 489). Young lawyers also have become involved in producing
law reports, manuals, and practitioner-oriented texts and providing research services for law firms.
By far the greatest concentration of solo practitioners and small partnerships is in the "household sector": house transfers, uncontested divorces,
debt collection, other minor civil litigation, and dealings with various
levels of government (Arthurs et al., 1971: 522 ff.; Yale, 1982: 38). Because
house transfers probably generate the most income, lawyers serving the
household sector are particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, especially in the residential real estate market. Since the profit on any individual transaction is small, only volume can produce high earnings. Lay
assistants, especially stenographers and title searchers, can handle most of
this work, leaving the lawyer free to supervise employees and deal with
clients (Colvin et al., 1978).
Because most individuals require legal services only occasionally, the
solo practitioner or small partnership constantly must attract clients. This
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is especially difficult in large cities, where social contact is attenuated and
competition for legal business is relatively fierce because of the impossibility of creating and enforcing informal understandings about price maintenance and other restrictive practices. Disproportionate numbers of Jews
and Catholics and members of other minority groups are located in this
sector of practice (Arthurs et al., 1971: 523). Because the household sector
offers only limited opportunity for sophisticated legal work, and because
of their own personal characteristics, these practitioners enjoy limited job
mobility. They will seldom be able to offer prospective employers highly
developed skills and reputations.
Ideological commitments formed or reinforced during service in a law
school or other community clinic setting lead some young graduates to
choose practice in the household sector or in criminal or family law. Others
enter loose associations or partnerships that focus on such issues as
women's rights, employment law, immigration, and prisoners' rights.
LAWYERS IN SMALLER CENTERS

Practice in smaller centers seems to be concentrated within a narrower
spectrum of settings. For several reasons, the largest firms are much smaller,
and solo practice is potentially more rewarding and prestigious than it
might be in Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver. On one hand, large industrial
or commercial concerns with plants or offices in small communities tend to
rely for their important legal needs on the elite metropolitan firms, whose
contacts are with their bankers, directors, and head office managers rather
than with local operational personnel. On the other hand, when household
clients in small centers encounter atypical or complex legal problems, such
as a patent, a murder charge, or a regulatory issue, they may seek the aid of
·
an outside expert.
Offsetting the more limited opportunities for professional advancement
is the much greater scope for community recognition and collegial support. Lawyers frequently join local elites, finding their way into politics,
civic works, and charities. Moreover, lawyers in small communities make
formal and informal arrangements concerning fees, assist each other with
personal problems in the event of disability (or even professional misconduct), and share knowledge and techniques.
LAWYERS EMPLOYED IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND
EDUCATION

Lawyers working as legal professionals in settings other than private
practice share certain common characteristics: (1) their identification with
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their employer's organizational aims and style produces a distinctive subculture setting them apart from private practitioners; (2) they are specialists with a highly developed sense of the particular political, social, and
economic context of law; and (3) because their earnings are not related
to the number of transactions processed or "billable hours" worked, employed lawyers are spared both the insecurity of solo practice and the intense pressure within elite firms. In a society characterized by increasing
bureaucratization, institutional growth, legal complexity, and a more refined division of labor, therefore, the number of employed lawyers has
increased over the past two decades, their status has improved, and their
rewards have been enhanced.

PUBLIC INTEREST

Because legal aid offices, community clinics, and advocacy organizations
are chronically short of funds, lawyers in these roles often are poorly paid
and carry heavy caseloads. Since these lawyers develop special skills and
insights into particular areas of law and campaign to reform them, however, their contribution and influence are out of all proportion to their
numbers and rewards. Their close and ongoing identification with a single
"client" and cause tends to differentiate them from other lawyers in terms
·
of ideology, lifestyle, and perception of the legal system.

STRATIFICATION: PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RANKING

Lawyers derive their prestige from at least three sources: professional
skills, public activities, and association with other prestigious persons and
institutions. It is not uncommon for a lawyer to be highly regarded by
colleagues as a careful conveyancer, tax planner, or procedural specialist
yet be virtually unknown to the general public. Conversely, lawyers who
are extremely active in business, community affairs, politics, or journalism
may be extremely well known to the public yet lack standing within the
profession. This often is the fate of lawyers employed in business, government, and the universities. Public and private reputations tend to coalesce
for lawyers in elite firms, which are involved in major transactions or
litigation and deliver specialized legal services of high quality.
These rankings may be reflected in the bestowal of government honors
- appointments to the bench and to boards and commissions of enquiry
and ad hoc special assignments. In some provinces, moreover, political
patronage · may strongly influence the appointment of Queen's Counsel
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and somewhat influence the appointment of lower court judges (Fowler,
1978; Robins, 1974; Angus, 1967; Ratushny, 1976). Rankings also are
evidenced by election to governing bodies of law societies and voluntary
organizations (Trebilcock et al., 1979). Here, too, political influences tend
to dominate peer judgments about reputation.

THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF PRACTICE

There is a fairly direct correlation between the location, size, and attractiveness of law offices and their infrastructure (office machinery, libraries,
and support staff) and the affluence of their clientele. Even solo lawyers
have sought to lower costs by adopting labor-saving devices, employing
paraprofessional staff (Altman & Weil, Inc., 1980: 13 ), locating offices in
older buildings or outside the central city or sharing premises with common
library facilities, reception, and telephone service.
However, cost-cutting has its limits. Law society regulations require the
submission of annually audited accounts. All practitioners must pay an annual fee to the provincial professional body, contribute to a compensation
fund, and pay premiums for errors and omissions" insurance-a total of
about Can$1,500 per annum in Ontario in 1984. Lawyers may bill whatever they wish, subject to subsequent arbitration by a court official (an
"assessment officer" in Ontario) and the theoretical (but actually negligible) risk of professional sanctions for overcharging (Reiter, 1978: 66).
Lawyers and clients, especially large institutional clients, also may reach
general understandings or explicit contractual arrangements concerning
fees. Litigants in most Canadian provinces may arrange to pay a fee
contingent on the outcome of the lawsuit (Arlidge, 1974; Halpern &
Turnbull, 1982), although some lawyers refuse to accept them. Moreover,
even in jurisdictions that do not formally permit contingent fees, lawyers often (and properly) take into account the "results achieved" in setting their fees, charging less to impecunious and unsuccessful litigants
(Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook, rule 10,
/1

SS.

1 (e), 2).

Statutory tariffs cover some matters, such as the probate of wills, while
court schedules of "party-and-party" costs regulate how much a losing
litigant must pay for the winner's legal fees (Orkin 1968). These official
indices influence what lawyers charge their own clients, adjusted for the
importance of the matter, the results achieved, and the time expended
(Re A -Solicitor (1972], 3 Ont. Rep. 433). Many local lawyers groups also
have adopted minimum or suggested fee tariffs for standard nonlitigious
services.
Governments intervene to affect the price of legal services as well. They
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have enacted legislation defining the scope of the professional monopoly, thereby restricting competition by lay persons or other occupational
groups (such as accountants) and increasing lawyer income (Trebilcock &
Reiter, 1982: 84 ff.); however, government affects professional incomes
most strongly through legal aid schemes. Although legal aid fee structures
do not govern private legal services, they may set a standard that paying clients will use. Legal clinics, legal aid staff lawyers, and publicly reimbursed private practitioners may undercut existing market prices.
This undercutting may reflect government-imposed budget limitations
as well as economies of scale. In some provinces many lawyers earn a
significant portion of their incomes from legal aid. When the government
cuts the budget, lawyers who depend on legal aid funds may find themselves pressed to the wall. Professional criticism of cutbacks in legal aid
thus expresses both a concern for access to justice and a desire to preserve
professional incomes (Bowlby, 1983: 145-147).
These factors differently affect the various professional strata. Elite law
firms and certain specialists generally disregard suggested fee tariffs. Solo
lawyers who practice family or criminal law may be highly sensitive to the
level of legal aid expenditures but largely indifferent to attempts to establish minimum conveyancing charges. Those specializing in real estate
may cooperate in price-fixing, especially if they work in small communities.

THE REGULATION OF NONPRICE COMPETITION

The rules of professional conduct regulate nonprice competition primarily
through limitations on the form and content of advertising (Hudec &
Trebilcock, 1982; Evans & Wolfson, 1982). While the controls generally
are more restrictive than those in the United States, there nevertheless are
important differences among the provinces. Manitoba, the most liberal
jurisdiction, permits lawyers to advertise price and nonprice information in
any medium as long as they do not mislead the public, avoid "puffery,"
accurately describe the services offered, and adhere to the fees quoted
(Mitchell, 1982: 129). Ontario not only forbids all advertising of fees
(except for the cost of an initial consultation) but also limits nonfee advertising to publication of the lawyer's professional card in newspapers and
other printed matter (Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct
Handbook, rules 13, 14). Howe-ver, the same law society also introduced a
lawyer referral system that informs clients of practitioner specialties and
entitles clients to an initial consultation at relatively low cost; and it
established a "Law Line" telephone service providing basic information on
typical legal problems and directing callers to the referral service (Bowlby,
1982: 158 ff.).
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In Ontario, the Professional Organizations Committee (1980: 192) noted
that individuals and small businesses in large urban settings are most likely
to lack information about legaJ services because they are less frequent
consumers than large corporate clients and because informal referral networks are less effective in large metropolitan areas. The CBA and many
provincial bodies have adopted a rule whose commentary notes that
"when considering whether or not limited advertising in a particular area
meets the public need, consideration must be given to the clientele to be
served" (Code of Professional Conduct, c. xiii, s. 6).
There is some evidence that urban solo practiti9ners and those in firms
with less than four lawyers most strongly support the liberalization of
advertising rules (Sharpe, 1981: 279). Their colleagues in rural areas and
small cities oppose any easing of these restrictions by an even greater
margin, however. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that neither
federal combines (antitrust) legislation nor quasiconstitutional guarantees
of freedom of expression prohibit such restrictions (Jabour v. Law Society of
British Columbia [1982], 137 D.L.R. [3d] 1 [Sup. Ct. Can.]).
Codes of conduct also prohibit lawyers from "touting" by approaching
potential clients directly, claiming "specialist" status, attracting publicity in
the media, or encouraging real estate agents, clubs, or other intermediaries
to "steer" business to them (Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional
Conduct Handbook, rule 13, ss. 7-8). Lawyers may not practice in multiprofessional firms, which could make internal referrals (Quinn, 1978); in
some provinces, they may not practice another profession or occupation
that could attract legal clients.
These measures limit the profession's urban "proletariat"- solo and
small firm practitioners-at the behest of its intermediate orders, practitioners in smaller centers. Although metropolitan solo practitioners do not
"poach" the clients of country lawyers, the latter seem to fear that greater
competition in their own locales will disturb existing patterns of practice.
Anticompetitive rules also provide a legitimate device for harrassing nonconformists in country towns and small cities. In larger centers, where
enforcement is more difficult, some competition persists within the household sector despite the rules.
Elite firms and specialists attract business by joining clubs, serving as
corporate directors, becoming involved in politics, providing community service, teaching part-time, and writing books. They seek to suppress
competition in order to strengthen the profession's image as a superior
social class rather than a "mere" trade or business. Since such restraints also
invite public disapproval without conferring economic benefits, however,
elite lawyers and leading specialists have no interest in actually enforcing
anticompetitive rules.
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EFFECT ON THE PROFESSION OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL SERVICES DELIVERY
Legal aid programs not only have encouraged more lawyers to practice
criminal and family law; they also have created jobs for salaried professionals in community-based clinics in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan and in government legal aid bureaus in Quebec. Indeed, legal aid
may have a greater impact on lawyers and their professional careers than
on low-income Canadians. Ontario established the first provincially funded
judicare scheme in 1967. The number of accused represented increased
from 1,587 persons in 1963 (Friedland, 1964) to nearly 41,000 in 1983, at a
cost of Can$21 million, or Can$523.86 per case (Law Society of Upper
Canada, 1983a: 49). National expenditures on legal aid rose from Can$62
million in 1975/76 to Can$90 million in 1978/79, and per capita expenditures from Can$2.71 to Can$3.81, although the latter figures vary greatly
among provinces. Between 1978/79 and 1984/85, the total expenditures
increased from Can$31 to Can$60 million in Quebec and from Can$34 to
Can$70 million in Ontario.
Because the provinces are responsible for administering justice, their
legal _aid programs differ significantly (Zemans, 1979; 1983: 373-435).
Federal cost-sharing agreements require the provinces to administer a
flexible means test that considers income, disposable assets, indebtedness,
maintenance obligations, and other expenses (National Legal Aid Research
Centre, 1981: 2; Statistics Canada, 1981: 20). In addition to providing legal
services for representation in court, many Canadian legal aid schemes have
adopted the Scottish duty counsel system, which provides a salaried lawyer to anyone making a first court appearance after having been taken
into custody. In some remote areas of the country, including the Yukon
and the Northwest Territories, duty counsel travel with the court. Most
are private lawyers paid a per diem, but Ontario recently hired full-time
duty counsel on two-year contracts to appear on bail applications and
guilty pleas in the criminal courts of metropolitan Toronto. Part-time duty
counsel also serve in the family courts.
In order to ensure that legal aid remains independent of government,
seven provinces have created autonomous corporations. In both Ontario
and New Brunswick, a committee of the provincial law society administers
the program. Within judicare jurisdictions, most regions have Area Committees composed primarily of volunteers, most of whom are lawyers, who
set policy and deal with appeals from refusals of service.
New Brunswick and Alberta reimburse private practitioners for providing legal aid. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island deliver almost all legal
aid through salaried lawyers. Although Ontario provides most legal ser-

.. /

162

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

vices through private lawyers, community clinics and the duty counsel
program do employ salaried lawyers. Most other provinces deliver legal
services through a mixed system, which has become known as "the Canadian compromise" between the English judicare and American salaried
models. In response to the inception of community clinics, the Ontario
profession commissioned its own "independent" study in 1972, which
reviewed the arguments for and against salaried legal services and, not
surprisingly, concluded:
Except for limited special purposes which may suggest the full engagement of
a solicitor for Legal Aid purposes, we remain of the view that the public is
better served by a profession forced to compete for public patronage (rich or
poor) in circumstances most likely to offer the public a meaningful choice and
where the lawyer is only paid for the work done. (Law Society of Upper
Canada, 1972: 42)
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Nevertheless, the profession gradually accepted community clinics,
partly because two judicial inquiries strongly supported them and encouraged government to increase their funding (Task Force on Legal Aid,
1974; Commission on Clinical Funding, 1978). About half of the more than
fifty clinics now operating provide specialized services (such as environmental law or worker health and safety) or target particular constituencies (native Canadians, the handicapped, and Spanish-speaking clients).
Community-elected boards of directors can establish standards for financial eligibility and criteria for selecting cases. Some clinics form part of
multiservice centers, which offer clients not only legal assistance but
also other social and medical services. Canadian clinics employ a larger
ratio of paraprofessionals to lawyers than do American legal services
programs, although the ratio has declined in recent years. Most Ontario
clinics have developed a strategic approach to legal services, involving
community education, community development, and law reform litigation.
Yet: most Canadian legal aid remains concerned with the discrete claims
and readily categorized legal problems .o f individual clients. Avrum Lazar
(n.d.), a federal evaluator of legal aid programs, recently observed: 'When
money was more readily available, discussions about legal aid concentrated
on meeting needs. Now discussions focus on controlling cost."
A British Columbia study concluded that there was little difference in
the unit cost of criminal defense provided by salaried and private lawyers
(Brantingham & Burns, 1981). A 1981 study of Quebec's mixed delivery
system. confirmed the cost-effectiveness of the salaried model, however,
which . had been demonstrated in an earlier Quebec study (Gervais &
Cloutier, 1982: 134 and appendices; Maheur, Noiseux Roy et Compagnie,
1979). The British Columbia and Quebec studies, as well as one in Ontario,
suggest that some private practitioners are specializing in legal aid, at least

.....
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in criminal matters. Even so, they may remain less expert than salaried
lawyers.
Judicare systems generally pay lawyers only 75 percent of market fees.
This involuntary charitable contribution was intended to express the
profession's concern for the plight of the poor, but it also assumed that all
lawyers would participate in legal aid, sharing their collective responsibility equally. Data indicate, however, that less than half of all lawyers
have remained on the legal aid panels, and the vast majority of those
handle very few cases (Ribordy, 1982c: 28; Brantingham & Bums, 1981:
59-60). Ontario recently assessed all lawyers an annual legal aid levy of
Can$175 to assist in funding increased payments and to legitimate the
profession's contribution to legal aid.
Despite the fact that many private practitioners derive virtually all their
income from judicare, the organized profession barely tolerates the salaried
legal aid lawyer (Morris & Stern, 1976). Clinic lawyers tend to associate
primarily with other clinic employees, and employees in thirteen out of
the forty-seven Ontario clinics have taken the unusual step of seeking
collective bargaining rights through a union. Private lawyers also perceive their colleagues who specialize in legal aid as being on the fringes
of the profession. The latter tend to practice in collectives and to locate
their offices in one area or even one building. Many have been the prime
movers in the development of 1 'left-wing" law groups, such as the Ontario
Law Union and Lawyers for Social Responsibility (Martin, 1985).

CONCLUSION
The cherished notion of a unified profession must give way to the more
accurate portrait of lawyers divided by function, clientele, and practice
setting, ranked in terms of prestige and income, differing in their concern
for anticompetitive restraints, and often disagreeing about professional
policies and public positions.
The ideology of professional solidarity does mediate the differences of
interest and identity, however, enabling the bar to close ranks in the face of
internal or external threats. This helps to explain the severe sanctions
imposed for trust violations and other ads of dishonesty, which undermine
the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client. Devotion to the
notion of unity also may reinforce the profession's extreme sensitivity to
any challenge to its independence.
The Canadian bar continues to manifest the indicia of classic professionalism. Perhaps because of the strength of the "professional project," subgroups have been slow to assert their distinctive interests and have submitted to· professional governing bodies dominated by private practi-

164

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

tioners overwhelmingly concerned with market control at the expense of
innovation and development. The profession's desire to govern legal aid
programs also reflects its hegemonic tendencies. Its preoccupation with
preventing the "socialization" of legal services (following the example of
medicine) retards the emergence of new areas of practice.
Despite eroding market control, the governing bodies of the Canadian
bar enjoy greater formal and effective autonomy than do their American
counterparts. Canadian lawyers have greater immunity from antitrust and
other regulatory legislation than do those in England. These differences do
not falsify general theories of the profession, but they do suggest that each
society has the capacity to mold its own legal profession. Comparative
examination must be sensitive to these particularities.
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Tables
4.1. Percentage of Firms Employing Law Oerks Which Use Them in Particular Activities

Estates
and

Substantive area
Title
searching
Corporate Collections
(debtorand
law and
conveyancing securities
creditor)

Fundion

Family

Wills

probate

Interviewing clients
Fact gathering
Preparing pleadings or legal
documents
Letter writing
Filing documents
Negotiations
Advocacy
Dealing with lawyers
Legal research and analysis
Search of public records
Preparing clients' fees and
disbursements

30
50

16
16

21
22

34
42

18

20
30
30
0
0
20
0
50

0

11
20

22

23

28

18

50
8
1

38
0
0
12

0
21

27
0
0
16
0
37

16
64

10

30
(N = 10)

11
(N = 19)

20
(N = 19)

24
(N = 246)

12
(N = 40)

5

10

0
0
5

Sources: Colvin et al. (1978: 249); Zemans (1982).

45

5

48

Taxation

Civil
litigation

Criminal
litigation

19
18

0
0

32
43

35
41

19
16
24

0
0
0
0
0
0

32
37

18
35
53
18
6
29

5

2
13
9
20
14
(N= 44)

63

0

18
6
33
25

0

60

47

0
(N = 2)

23
(N = 45)

24

18

(N

=

17)
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4.2. Geographic Distribution of Canadian Lawyers, 1981

Province

Percent

Newfoundland

0.8

Prince Edward Island
Nova ScoHa

0.3

New Brunswick
Quebec

2.0

Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Yukon and Territories

Source: Statistics Canada (1981).

2.7
25.3
39.3
3.5

3.0
9.8
13.1
0.2

1

4.3. Median Income of Lawyers and Staff by Firm Size, 1979 and 1981 (Can$)
Number of lawyers in firm
2-6

I

Status
Partners and proprietors
Associates
J\chninistrators
Paralegals

1979

1981

30,000

30,000

15,000

-

-

15,923

Source: Altman and Weil, Inc. (1982: 14).

1979

12-19

7-11
1981

1979

1981

1979

1981

20-29
1979

1981
99,876
32,440

40,000

49,077

69,742

90,600

82,525

24,000
21,750

59.500
24,325
22,000

68,284

20,000
16,681

30,000
24,300

23,868

26,113

21,710

27,500
28,250

13,000

18,100

17,998

16,120

18,365

17,000

17,400

-

33,300
20,500

30+
1979
1981
93,500

129,021

27,750

40,000

-

17,689

39,000
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4.4. lnterprovincial Mobility of Lawyers

Percentage of
lawyers practicing in
province in 1978
who were
In same community
in 1973
In different community but same
province in 1973
In different province
in 1973

Provinces•
NWT NS Ont

Alb

BC

Man

NB

Que

Sask

Yukon

83

85

95

86

0

94

94

95

87

67

7

10

3

8

0

4

5

3

8

11

10

5

2

6

100

2

1

2

5

22

"Abbreviations: Alb-Alberta; BC-British Columbia; Man-Manitoba; NB-New Brunswick;
NS-Nova Scotia; Ont-Ontario; Que-Quebec; Sask- Saskatchewan.
Source: Berger (1979: 14).

4.5. Age Distribution of Canadian Lawyers (in Percent), 1931-1981

!

I'

Year

25-34

35-44

Age
45-54

1931

27

31

20

13

8

1941
1951

23

25
25

26
20

15

27

17

10
10

1961

34

27

17

11

9

1971

36
48

28

17
14

9

7

7

3

1981

26

Source: Statistics Canada (1931-1981).

55-64

65+

169

CANADA

4.6. Lawyers and Notaries in Canada, by Sex, 1931-1981

female

Female as
percent of
total

Male

Female

Total

2
2

-3

-2

13

139
53

12,068

3
5
15

33
35

57
152

34

16,315

87

563

110

Year

Male

1931
1941

8,004

54

8,058

1

7,791

129

7,920

1951
1961

8,841

197

9,038

11,759

309

15,535

780
5,175

1971
1981

29,030

Decennial percentage
increase

Total

34,205

14
35

Source: Statistics Canada (1931- 1981).

4.7. Undergraduate Law Students, 1956/57-1979/80

Year

Total number

Annual increase, %

1956/57

2,651

0.7

1958/59

2,714

1.2

1959/60

0.0

1966/67

2,710
4,464

9.2

1967/68

5,071

13.6

1968/69

5,735

13.1

1969/70

6,443

12.3

1976177
1977/78

9,204
9,402

6.1
2.2

1978/79
1979/80

9,456

0.6
1.4

9,590

Source: Statistics Canada (1981).

4.8. Competition to Enter Law School
1978/79

First-year applications received
Offers made
First-year enrollment

Total enrollment
Source: McKennirey (1983: 72- 73).

26,066

1980/81
24,423

6,890 (26.4%)

7,412 (30.3%)

3,317 (12.7%)

3,270 {13.4%)

9,480

9,410
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4.9. Annual Revenues of Law Foundations From Interest on Trust Accounts, Can$
Year

Ontario

Saskatchewan

1974
1975
1976
1977

4,056,684
4,333,973

383,995
526,854

4,545,742
4,795,610

468,495
500,700
580,575

'171,196

1978
1979

5,200,767

1981
1982

12,591,707"
8,515,688
9,869,816

1983
1984

4,132,751

627,098
1,278,83411
1,538,824"

8,142,784
16,001,874"

1980

6,600,959"

950,409
871,743
1,051,820

1985
0

British Columbia

4,454,563

The increase is attributable to high interest rates.

Source: Law Foundation, Annual Reports.
4.10. Distribution (in Percent) of Members and Elected Benchers of Law Society of
Upper Canada, by Firm Size, 1978

Firm size
1
2-4

.

9.3

Nonmetropolitan
Benchers
Members

Total
Members
Benehers
24.0
45.0

8.0

13.0

17.3

18.7
21.3
4.0

29.0
9.0
3.0

22.7
28.0

10+

4.0
6.7
28.0

11.0
16.0
6.0
13.0

32.0

17.0

Total

48.0

46.0

52.0

54.0

100.0

100.0

5-9
,I

Metropolitan
Benchers
Members

15.0

I

11

Source: Trebilcock et al. (1979).
4.11. Distribution (in Percent) of Members and Elected Benchers of Law Society of
Upper Canada, by Employment Context
Benchers elected in
1971 and 1975

Membership in
February 1977

Law firm .

93.75

Academic

6.25

Other
Retired or out of province

0.0
0.0

78.4
1.2
J4.4

Employment context

Source: Trebilcock et al. (1979: 209).

5.9
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4.12. Complaints I Ieard by Convocation of Law Society of Upper Canada, by Nature of
Misconduct, 1972-'f984
Reason
Financial
Books, records, accounts
Misappropriation (misapplication of clients' money)
False and misleading statements, documents, records
Borrowing from clients
Failure to account to clients
ConAid of Interest
Conduct unbecoming
Failure to carry out clients' instrudions
Failure to report to client or serve diligenUy
Failure to respond to LSUC communications
Admissions and agreed statements

Number of cases
233
78
59
32
28
14
12
16
13
12
26
36

Total

336

Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports.

4.13. Premium for Ontario Errors and Omission Insurance and Claims Experience
Premium, Can$
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
"1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

100
110
110
135
135
200
375
375
450
665
820
1,068

Claims per 1,000 lawyers

29.2
37.0
46.3
48.5
70.0"
49.3
74.3
83.6
96.4

Distortion attributable to change in insurer.
Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Reports; Law Society of Upper Canada (1983b).

0
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4.14. Causes of Loss for Payments by Ontario Errors and Omissions Insurance, 1977-1982

Percent losses

Cause
Missed limitation

13

Defective search
Ignorance of law
Failure to follow client's instruction
Undertakings
Poor communication with clients
Conflict-working for two or more parties
Other
Total
Real estate matters

20

Percent claims

8

16
16
7

14

15

8

3

2

2

2

2

33
100

100

62

53

39

Source: Law Society of Upper Canada, Annual Report (1982: 155).

4.15. Law Faculties and Emollments, 1925

Teachers
Students

School

Full-time

Part-time

Dalhousie
McGill
Osgoode Hall
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Montreal
Alberta
Laval
New Brunswick
Vancouver

3

20

3

12

64

3

353

3

3
2

3

7

55

0

17

149

3
0

4
22

56

0

1.7

0

Source: Law Society of Upper Canada (1927).

50

42

89
20
31
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4.16. Costs, Prerequisites, and Length of Legal Training, 1927/28

School

Tuition, Can$

Alberta
Vancouver
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Nova Scotia
Ontario
McGill
Montreal
Laval
Saskatchewan

115
15
108-118

College
prerequisite
(years)

102
162
100
162-122
160
125
71

Course
length
(years)

Academic
year
(weeks)

2

3

l

3

2
2

4
3

2

3

2

3

2

3

Degree
Degree
2

3

24
24
28
24
29
29
30
32.5
32.5
27

3
3

Concurrent
with clerkship
No
Yes
Yes (2 of 4)
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

Source: Reed (1928).

4.17. Mean Number of Lawyers and Articling Students by Firm Size, Ontario, 1977

Firm size
(lawyers)
1
2-4
5-9
10+

Toronto
Articling
Lawyers
students

1
2.5
6.6
23.4

Rest of Ontario
Articling
Lawyers
students

0.1
0.3
1.1
4.2

0.1
0.3
1.2
1.6

l

2.6
6.1
12.0

Total
Articling
Lawyers
students
1
2.5
6.3
19.8

0.1
0.3
1.1
3.4

Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 103).

4.18. Clientele (in Percent) by Firm Size, Ontario, 1976
Number
of
lawyers
in firm

Public
corporations

1
2-4

3

5-9

8

10+

16

Nonpublic
corporations and
unincorporated
businesses

4

Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 87).

Government
and
nonprofit

Legal aid
recipients

Other
funding

17
21

14

61
60

3

30
42

8
4

48

5

33

5

11

3

Other
1
1
1
0
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4.19. Distribution (in Percent) of Firms by Size of Firm and City, Ontario, 1977

City size

Firm size (lawyers)
2-4
5-9

1

Under 30,000
30,000-100,000

16.6
14.3

100,000-500,000
500,000+

10+

20.4

13.7
18.0

23.6

17.7
24.8

0
8.3

30.2

19.4

45.6

37.1

38.1

72.2

Source: Colvin et al. (1978: 160).

4.20. Length of Time (in Percent) to Partnership, by Firm Size

Number of lawyers in firm
6-10
10+

Years to
partnership

1

2-5

Under 5

54.5

59.8

34.3

14.3

44.2

5

36.4

26.8

40.0

51.4

36.4

9.1

13.4

25.7

34.3

19.4

Over 5

· Source: Canadian Bar Association (1985).

Total

4.21. Income of Lawyers by Experience and Firm Size, 1985, Can$

Year of
admission

Partners

1 Partner
Associates

2-5 Partners

Partners

Assodates

6-10 Partners

Partners

Associates

11 Partners or more
Partners
Associates ·

25,200

21,000

26,200

1983

50,300

29,100

28,400

32,600

1982

57,400

35,000

27,700

37,400

1981

50,300

33,300

37,200

41,000

1984

49,200

1980
65,900

1979

86,300

72,400

1978
1977
1974-1976

47,500

1970-1973

73,800

73,700

45,400a

85,000

39,800"

107,300

91,700

120,900

1964-1969

90,400

90,300

136,200

Before 1964

98,900

94,300

145,000

Prior to 1978
Source: Canadian Bar Association (1985).
4
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4.22. Distribution of Legal Aid Payments by Lawyer, Ontario, 1985

Amount paid (Can$)

Number of lawyers

Percent of lawyers paid

1-1,000

J,329

27.3

1,000-5,000

1,671

34.3

5 ,000-10,000

730

15.0

10,000-20,000

589

12.l

20,000-30,000

241

4.9

30,000-40,000

119

2.4

Over 40,000

191

4.0

Source: Law Society of Upper Canada (1985: 17).

NOTES
We wish to thank David Stager of the University of Toronto Department of
Economics for his guidance regarding statistical data and Richard Abel, Phil!p
Lewis, and Terrence Halliday for their encouragement stimulation, and frank
criticism. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in 1986 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 447.
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1. Notaries Act, Rev. Stat. Quebec 1977, c. N-2. The Quebec notary "becomes
the confidential advisor in family affairs; he is entrusted with the winding up and
management of estates; makes reports on titles, secures charters for joint stock
companies; receives oaths and statutory declarations; ads as legal advisor for
his clients; negotiates loans and ads as agent for the sale of real estate" (Canadian Law List, 1985: 1158-1159). In all other Canadian provinces, except British
Columbia, notaries are limited to taking affidavits; "notarizing" documents (i.e.,
attesting them to be true); and drawing, passing, or issuing deeds and contracts
(see, e.g., Ontario's Notaries Ad:, Rev. Stat. Ontario 1980, c. 319, s. 34). All
lawyers in private practice and most lawyers employed by governments or
corporations also hold an appointment as a notary. Nonlawyer notaries usually
are corporate officers or in businesses such as travel agencies, where notarization
of documents frequently is required. The Professional Organizations Committee
estimated that there were 552 nonlawyer notaries in Ontario.
2. Provincial law societies provide for readmission (see, e.g., Law Society
Regulations, Law Society of Upper Canada (1975], ss. 30[2], 31). However, they
limit the· return of judges or government administrators to avoid conflicts of
interest .(see, e.g., Manitoba Professional Conduct Handbook, 1982: 64; Barreau de
Quebec, 1976: s. 99 [a]).
3. See Laskin (1969) and Fowler (1978). In Ontario, any lawyer in good
standing with at least twelve years' experience and peer recommendations can
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apply. There has been no limit on the number of appointments and no requirement to canvass the views of the profession or the judiciary. Roberts (1984)
estimated that 3,000 of the province's 16,000. lawyers were Queen's Counsel. In
1986 the provincial government generated considerable controversy by announcing that it would cease to recommend further appointments and was abolishing
existing titles retroactively.
4. Zemans (1986: 9-10) found that the ratio of community legal workers to
lawyers in Ontario legal aid clinics was slightly greater than 2: 1 in 1980, but by
1984 it had dropped to 1.6: 1.
5. Altman and Weil, Inc. (1980: 14) found that there were 0.23 paralegals per
lawyer in Canada compared to 0.17 in the United States. The highest ratio is in
Ontario (0.25) and the lowest, in Quebec (0.10). Small firms and sole practitioners
have a higher ratio than do large firms.
6. See, for example, Statutory Powers Procedures Act, Rev. Stat. Ontario
1980, c. 484, s. 10; Rules of the Provincial Court (Civil Division), Ontario Reg.
797 I 84; Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. Canada 1970, c. 34, s. 7 35. There are no rules
permitting Canadian law students to appear in superior courts. A study of Toronto
labor arbitration between 1971 and 1973 revealed that trade unions use lawyers in
approximately one-third of cases- 42 percent where an employee has been
discharged. In all other cases, a union representative appeared for the member
(Goldblatt, 1974: 30-42).
7. In determining the "real market" for legal services it is necessary to consider
the effect on aggregate demand of corporate as well as individual clients, of
changing intensities of legal regulation, and of overall fluctuations in economic
activity.

REFERENCES
Abel, Richard L. 1981. "Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers," 1981 Wisconsin
Law Review 1117.
Adam, Barry. 1981. "Stigma and Employability: Discrimination by Sex and Sexual
Orientation in the Ontario Legal Profession," 18 Canadian Review of Sociology
and Anthropology 216.
Adam, Barry, and Kathleen Lahey. 1981. "Professional Opportunities: A Survey
of the Ontario Legal Profession," 59 Canadian Bar Review 674.
Altman and Weil, Inc. 1980. Economic Survey of Canadian Law Firms. Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association.
- -- . 1982. Economic Survey of Canadian Law Firms. Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association.
Angus, W. 1967. "Judicial Seledion in Canada-the Historical Perspective," 1
Canadian Legal Studies 220.
Arlidge, Bruce. 1974. "Contingent Fees," 11 Ottawa Law Review 374.

~ ·

!

178

: i
I

'

I

I

·I '
I I
I I
Io
11

: ,j
'i

'

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

Arnup, John. 1982. "The 1957 Breakthrough," 16 Law Society of Upper Canada
Gazette 180.
Arthurs, Harry W. 1967. 'The AffiJiatjon of Osgoode Hall Law School with York
University," 18 University of Toronto Law Journal 197.
- -. 1970. "Discipline in the Legal Profession in Ontario," 7 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 235 .
- - - . 1971. "Authority, Accountability and Democracy in the Ontario Legal
Profession," 49 Canadian Bar Review l.
- - -. 1982. "Public Accountability of the Legal Profession," in Philip Thomas,
ed., Law in the Balance. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- - -. 1984. "The Law Giveth, the Law Taketh Away: Notes from an Agnostic
on the Rule of Law in Canada." Conference, York University.
Arthurs, Harry W., Larry Taman, and J. Williams. 1971. "The Toronto Legal
Profession: An Exploratory Survey," 21 University of Toronto Law Journal 498.
Auerbach, Jerold. 1976. Unequal Jusfice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baker, G. B. 1983. "Legal Education in Upper Canada 1785-1889: The Law
Society as an Educator," in David Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian
Law, vol. IL Toronto: Osgoode Society.
Barrcau du Quebec. 1976. Documentation Professionelle. Montreal: Editions Y Blais.
Batten, Jack. 1980. 'Tory, Tory," in Lawyers, chap. 5. Toronto: Macmillan.
Belobaba, Edward. 1978. "Civil Liability as a Professional Competence Incentive."
Ontario: Professional Organization Committee.
Berger, E., Ltd. 1979. Demographic Survey of the Canadian Bar. Ottawa: Canadian
Bar Association.
Bowlby, John. 1982. "Annual Report of the Treasurer," 16 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 133.
- -. 1983. "Annual Report: 1982," 17 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 126.
Boyd, M. 1981. "Status AHainment in Canada," 18 Canadian Review of Sociology
and Anthropology 657.
Brantingham, P., and Peter Bums. 1981. "The Burnaby, British Columbia Experimental Public Defender Project: An Evaluation." Ottawa: Department of Justice and Vancouver: British Columbian Legal Services Society.
Browning, B. G. 1976. Admissions Criteria Research Project. Winnipeg: University
of Manitoba (unpublished).
Buchanan, Anselan. 1925. The Bench and Bar of Lower Canada Down to 1850.
Montreal: Burtons.
Bucknall, 8., T. Baldwin, and J. Lakjn. 1968. ''Pedants, Practitioners, and Prophets:
Legal Education at Osgoode Hall to 1957," 6 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 137.
Cadres Professionels, Inc. 1968. "Les Avocats du Quebec: Etude Socioeconomique." Montreal: Cadres Professionels.
Canadian Bar Association (CBA). 1920. Canons of Legal Ethics. Ottawa: Canadian
Bar Association.

CANADA

179

- - - . 1978. Towards a New Consfitution. Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association.
- - - . 1985. "National Law Firm Survey." Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association.
Canadian Law List. 1983. Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, Inc.
- - - . 1985. Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, Inc. ·
Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1983. Ottawa: Government Publications Office.
Clarry, John. 1982. "Interprovincial Law Firms," 16 Law Society of Upper Canada

Gazette 266.
Clement, William. 1975a. The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic
Power. Toronto: Mclelland and Stewart.
- --. 1975b. "Inequality of Access: Characteristics of the Canadian Corporate
Elite," 12 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 33.
Coburn, D., G. M. Terrance, and J. Kaufert. 1983. "Medical Dominance in Canada
in Historical Perspective," 1.3 International journal of Health Services 407.
Cole, Curtis. 1983. "A Developmental Market: Competition and Professional
Standards in the Ontario Legal Profession, 1881- 1936," 6 Canada-US. Law
Journal 125.
Colvin, Eric. 1979. "The Division of Legal Labour," 17 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
595.

Colvin, Selma, David Stager, Larry Taman, Janet Yale, and Frederick H. Zemans.
1978. The Marlcet for Legal Services: Paraprofessionals and Specialists. Toronto:.
Professional Organizations Committee (Working Paper No. 10).
Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare (Castonguay-Nipreau Commission). 1970. Report. Quebec: Government of Quebec.
Commission of Clinical Funding. 1978. Report. Toronto: The Commission.
Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law. 1983. Law and Learning.
Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
Cuneo, C., and J. Curtis. 1975. "Social Ascription in the Educational and Occupational Status AHainment of Urban Canadians," 12 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 6.
Davies, A. L. 1952. "Unauthorized Practice of Law," 10 University of Toronto
Faculty of Law Review 17.
Economic Council of Canada. 1969. "Interim Report on Competition." OHawa:
Economic Council of Canada.
Esau, Alvin. 1979. "Specialization and the Legal Profession," 8 Manitoba Law
Journal 25 5.
- - - . 1.981. "Recent Developments in Specialized Regulation of !:he Legal Profession," 11 Manitoba Law Journal 133.
Evans, Robert G., and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds. 1982. Lawyers and the Consumer
Interest. Toronto: Butterworths.
Evans, Robert, and Alan D. Wolfson. 1982. "Cui Bono-Who Benefits from
Improved Access to Legal Services?" in Robert G. Evans and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the Consumer Interest. Toronto: BuHerworths.
Farris, John. 1972. "Let's Kill all the Lawyers,"3(2) Canadian Bar Journal 4.

180

.I

: ~'

'..

.,' .
1r

,,1 •

".

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

Feltham, I. R., and E. A. Campin. 1981. "The Emerging Role of Corperate Counsel."
Banff, Alberta: National Conference of Corporate Counsel (unpublished).
Fowler, Kathryn. 1978. "Queen's Counsel: Honour Without Meaning?" 2(3)
Canadian Lawyer 30.
Freidson, Eliot. 1970. Profession of Medicine: A Study in the Sociology of Applied
Knowledge. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
Friedland, Martin. 1964. Legal Aid Working Papers. Toronto: Joint Committee on
Legal Aid.
Gall, Gerald. 1977. ''The Lawyer as Lobbyist," 15 Alberta Law Review 400.
Gervais, Pierre P., and Robert Cloutier. 1982. Evaluation de ['Aide Juridique. SteFoy, Quebec: Ministere de la Justice.
Gibson, D., and L. Gibson. 1972. Substantial justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba
1670- 1970. Winnipeg: Peguis.
Giffen, P. T. 1961. "Social Control and Professional Self-Government: A Study of
the Legal Profession in Canada," in S. D. Clarke, ed., Urbanism and the Changing
Canadian Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Gold, N. 1972. "Competence and Continuing Legal Educatio11-,'' in N. Gold, ed.,
Essays on Legal Education. Toronto: Butterworths.
- - -. 1978. "The Interface between the Paraprofessional and the Professional:
Some Reflections on the Lawyer and the Community Legal Services Paralegal
Worker," in National Workshop on Paralegalism, ed., Public Sector Paralegalism
in Canada Today. Vancouver: National Legal Aid Research Centre.
Goldblatt, M. 1974. Justice Delayed ... Toronto: Labour Council of Metropolitan
Toronto.
Goodman, E. 1971. "The Lawyer in Public Life," in Law Society of Manitoba, ed.,
Isaac Pith/ado Lectures on Continuing Legal Education. Winnipeg: Law Society
of Manitoba.
Guppy, L., and J. Siltanen. 1977. "A Comparison of the Allocation of Male and
Female Occupational Prestige," 14 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 320.
Halpern, P., and S. Turnbull. 1982. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Fees Contracts," in R. G. Evans and M. J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the Consumer
Interest. Toronto: Butterworths.
Harvey, Cameron. 1970. "Women in Law in Canada," 4 Manitoba Law Journal 9.
Hawkins, Robert. 1978. "A State of Siege: The Legal Profession in Ontario at the
Tum of the Century" (unpublished).
Heinz, John P., and Edward 0. Laumann. 1983. Chicago Lawyers: ,The Social
Structure of the Bar. New York: Russell Sage and Chicago: American Bar
Foundation.
Henderson, G. 1977. "Advertising and Professional Fees under the Combines
Investigation Ad," in Law Society of Upper Canada, ed., The Professions.
Toronto: DeBoo.
Hudec, Albert, and Michael Trebilcock. 1982. "Lawyer Advertising and the Sup-

CANADA

181

ply of Information in the Market for Legal Services," 20 University of Western

Ontario Law Review 53.
Hunter, Lawson 1983. "Are There Too Many Lawyers? The Government's
View," 6 Canada-U.S. Law journal 199.
Hurlburt, W., ed. 1979. The Legal Profession and Quality of Service. Ottawa:
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice.
Huxter, Marie. 1981. "Survey of Employment Opportunites for Articling Students and Graduates of the Bar Admission Course in Ontario," 15 Law Society
of Upper Canada Gazette 169.
Issalys, Pierre. 1978. "The Professions Tribunal and the Control of Ethical Conduct among Professionals," 24 McGill Law journal 588.
Jackson, R. J., and M. M. Atkinson. 1980. The Canadian Legislative System. Toronto: Gage.
Johnson, Terence J. 1972. Professions and Power. London: Macmillan.
Johnston, George. 1972. "The Law Society of Upper Canada 1797-1972," 6 Law

Society of Upper Canada Gazette 1.
Lachance, A. 1966. Le barreau au Canada sous le regime Franrais. Quebec: Societe
Historique de Quebec.
Lajoie, Andrea, and Claude Parizcau. 1976. La Place de ]uriste dans la Societe
Quebecoise. Montreal: Themis.
Larson, Magali Sarfatti. 1977. The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analyisis.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Laskin, Bora. 1969. The British Tradition in Canadian Law. London: Stevens.
- - - . 1972. "The Common Tie between Judges and Law Teachers," 6 Law
Society of Upper Canada. Gazette 147.
- - - . 1983. "Cecil A. Wright: A Personal Memoir," 33 University of Toronto
Law journal 148.
Law Society of Upper Canada. 1927. Proceedings in Convocation. Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada.
- -- . 1972. Report of the Special Committee on Legal Education (MacKinnon Committee). Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada.
- - - . 1982. Community Legal Services Report. Toronto: Law Society of Upper
Canada.
- --. 1983a. Ontario Legal Aid Plan Annual Report. Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada.
- - - . 1983b. ''The Report of the Special Committee on Numbers of Lawyers,"
17 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 222.
- -- . l 983c. Professional Conduct Handbook. Toronto: Law Society of Upper
Canada.
- - . 1985. Ontario Legal Aid Plan Annual Report. Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada.
Lazar, A n.d. Legal Aid in the Age of Restraint, quoted in M. J. Mossman, Legal Aid
in Canada (1983; unpublished).

i

1

I

....-- .
I

•I

182

Ii
•t

': tr,
....
, 1 .,

1111

I r1

I

•1

• I \1

11 ••

.I

I

II
I

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

Leal, H. Allan. 1982. "Are There Too Many Lawyers?" 6 Canada-U.S. Law Journal
166.
Lenoir, Robert 1981. "Citizenship as a Requirement for the Practice of Law in
Ontario," 13 Ottawa Law Review 527.
Levy, M. 1972. "Attitudes of the Most Likely to Succeed: A Survey of the First
Year Class, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1971- 72." Toronto: York University
(unpublished).
Lortie, Leon. 1975. "The Early Teaching of Law in French Canada," 2 Dalhousie
Law Journal 521.
MacAlister, A. 1928. The Bench and Bar of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick. Montreal: John Lovell.
·
MacDonald, Rod. 1979.""Legal Education on the Threshold of the 1980's," 44
Saskatchewan Law Review 39.
MacEachern, W. 1976. "Medicine, Law, and Politics," 24 Chitty's Law Journal 109.
~.__Macfarlane, P. D. 1980. "The Legal Profession in Canada: A Research Perspective
\\ and Prospectus," 28 Chitty's Law journal 50.
Mackay, Pierre. 1979. "L'Enseignernent du droit clans une perspective de changement social," 44 Saskatchewan Law Review 73.
McKennirey, J. 1983. Canadian Law Faculties. Ottawa: Social Science and Humanities Research Council.
Mackimmie, K. A. 1963. "The Presidential Address," 6 Canadian Bar Journal 347.
McKinlay, J., and J. Arches. 1985. "Towards the Proletarianization of Physicians,"
15 International Journal of Health Services 161.
Maclaren, J. 1974. "Legal Education: Common Law Canada," 11 Universiti de
Ottawa Colloque International du Droit Compare 54.
Maheur, Noiseux Roy et Compagnie. 1979. "Etudes des coutes d'execution des
classiers juridiques," in Commission des Services ]uridiques, Seventh Annual
Report of the Commission des Services Juridiques. Montreal: Commission des

erv1c Jt;tt:.idi~
_ ---- ~
----~
~ ""' '~"
Marmor, T., and W. D-:wttite-:-1-9!J.f.h.Paraprofessionals and Issues of Public Regulation
---- _T~:~nto: Profes~_?~al Q_rgaruafi-ons--Gemm!t_!~ (Wor~~er No. lQ).
Martin, Robert 1985. "The Law Union of Ontario," 7
& Policy 51.
Marshall, Allan. 1980. "Practice Advisory Services," 14 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 357.
Mitchell, Chester W. 1982. "The Impact, Regulation and Efficacy of Lawye
Advertising," 20 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 119.
Moore, J. 1980. The Attitudes of Canadians Toward the Law and the Lega[ System
(unpublished).
More, R. 1982. "Perception of the Law and the Legal System: A Preliminary
Report: of the Findings," in Dale Gibson and Janet Baldwin, eds., Law and a
. Cynical Society? An International Conference on Law and Public Opinion. Calgary:
Carswell Legal Publications.
Morris, Pauline, and Ronald N. Stem. 1976. Cui Bono? A Study of Comm.unity Law

raw·

:J

CANADA

Offices and Legal Aid Society Offices in British Columbia. Vancouver: Ministry of
the Attorney General.
Mullagh, M . E. 1977. The Law Firm in British Columbia: Economics, Organization, Size and Composition," 11 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 270.
Murray, E. 1979. Transfer of Professionals from Other Jurisdictions to Ontario. Toronto: Professional Organizations Committee.
National Legal Aid Research Centre. 1981. Legal Aid Services in Canada 1979/80.
Ottawa: National Legal Aid Research Centre.
Nelligan, John. 1950. Lawyers in Canada: A Half-Century Count," 28 Canadian
Bar Review 727.
- - - . 1951. "Income of Lawyers," 29 Canadian Bar Review 34.
Newman, James. 1974. Reaction and Change: A Study of the Ontario Bar,
1880- 1920," 32 University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 51.
Newman, Peter. 1975. The Canadian Establishment, vol. 1. Toronto: Seal Book.
Orkin, Mark. 1957. Legal Ethics. Toronto: Cartwright.
- - . 1968. The Law of Costs. Toronto: Canada Law Book.
- - . 1971. "Professional Autonomy and the Public Interest: A Study of the
Law Society of Upper Canada. D. Jur. thesis, York University, Osgoode Hall
Law School.
Parker, Graham. 1982. The Pedigrees of the Nova Scotia Judiciary," 2(2) Now and
Then 36.
Pasis, H. E. 1970. Lawyers and Political Participation." M.A. thesis, McMaster
University.
Pepin, Giles. 1979. L'Avenir du Professionalisme au Quebec," 39 Revue du
Barreau 820.
Pike, R. 1980. Education, Class, and Power in Canada," in R. J. Ossenberg, ed.,
Power and Change in Canada. Toronto: MeLelland and Stewart.
Porter, J. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- - -. 1979. The Measure of Canadian Society: Education, Equality, and Opportunity.
Agincourt, Ont.: Gage.
Posluns, Donald. 1980. "Professional Advertising Policies under the Amended
Combines Investigation Act," 4 Canadian Business Law Journal 235.
Prichard, Robert. 1978. Professional Civil Liability and Continuing Competence," in L. Klar, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law. Toronto: Butte1worths.
Professional · Organizations Committee. 1980. Report. Toronto: Professional
Organizations Committee.
Quinn, John. 1978. Multidisciplinary Services: Organizational Innovation in Professional Service Markets. Toronto: Professional Organizations Committee
(Working Paper No. 7).
Ratushny, Ed. 1976. "Judicial Appointments: The Lang Legacy," in A. Linden, ed.,
The Canadian Judiciary. Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School.
Reed, Alfred Z. 1925. "Advance Extract," in Carnegie Foundation, Twentieth
Annual Report. New York: Carnegie Foundation.
11

11

11

l

!

183

11

11

11

11

11

11

....---

184

Harry Arthurs, Richard Weisman, Frederick Zemans

- . 1928. Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada. New York:
Carnegie Foundation.
Reiter, Barry J. 1978. Discipline as a Means of Assuring Continuing Competence in the
Professions. Toronto: Professional Organizations Committee (Working Paper
No. 11).
Ribordy, Francois. 1982a. "Les avocats de Sudbury 1891- 1981." Sudbury, Ont:
Universite Laurentienne (unpublished).
- -. 1982b. "Sudbury's Lawyers 1891-1981." Paper presented to Tenth World
Congress of Sociology, Mexico City (unpublished).
- - . 1982c. "Les Services d'Aide Juridique aSudbury," 5(4) Canadian Legal Aid
Bulletin 18.
·
- - -. 1983. "Cent ans de presence des avocats a Sudbury," 17 Law Society of
Upper Canada Gazette 51.
Richmond, A. 1967. Post-War Immigrants in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Riddell, W. 1928. The Bar and Courts of the Province of Upper Canada or Ontario.
Toronto: Macmillian.
Roberts, Alasdair. 1984. "The Ubiquitous Q.C.," 18 The Advocate 39.
Robins, Sidney. 1971. "Our Profession on Trial," 7 Law Society of Upper Canada
-

Gazette 1.

:.i. ,
I
',j

I
I

·I

- -- . 1974. "The Appointment of Queen's Counsel," 8 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 157.
Ronson, J. 1978. "The Training of Paralegals in Ontario," 12 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 192.
Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (McRuer Commission). 1968, Ontario.
Russell, P. 1982. "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of
Canadian Court·s," 25 Canadian Public Administration 1.
Samac, Z. 1985. "The Lawyer as a Politician: Results of a Survey" (unpublished).
Schloesser, N. 1979. History and Organization of Notaries in Ontario. Toronto:
Professional Organizations Committee .
Schumiatcher, M. 1979. Man of Law: A Model. Saskatoon: Western Producer.
Shupe, William. 1981. "Legal Advertising in Saskatchewan: Tune-up or Overhaul," 45 Saskatchewan Law Review 259.
Sinclair, A. 1975. "L'avocat au Quebec: 209 ans d'histoire," 16 Cahiers du Droit
689.
Smith, D., and L. Tepperman. 1974. "Changes in the Canadian Business and Legal
Elites 1870-1970," 11 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 97.
Smith, W. Earl. 1948. "The Law Society of Upper Canada," 26 Canadian Bar
Review 437.
Snider, L. 1981. Legal Services in Rural Areas: An Evaluation Report. Ottawa:
Department of Justice.
Stager, David. 1981. "Report to the Special Committee on Numbers." Toronto:
Law Society of Upper Canada (unpublished).
- -. 1982. "The Markel for Lawyers in Ontario: 1931to1981 and Beyond," 6

I
.
I

I

l

I

j
I

!

1
l

l

CANADA

185

Canada-U.S. Law Journal 113.
Statistics Canada (1931-1981). Census of Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services.
- - - . 1981. Legal Aid, 1981. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
Swan, John. 1982. "Regulating Continuing Competence," in Robert G. Evans
and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the Consumer Interest. Toronto:
Butterworths.
Taman, Larry. 1978. "The Emerging Paraprofessionals," in P. Slayton and Michael
J. Trebilcock, eds., The Professions and Public Policy. Tqronl:o: University of
Toronto Press.
Task Force on Legal Aid. 1974. The Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid. Ontario:
Ministry of the Al:l:omey General.
Taylor, Thom H. 1981. "Paralegals in Saskatchewan Community Legal Services
Clinics," 4 Canadian Legal Aid Bulletin 89.
Thom, Stuart. 1974. "The Nature and Function of the Law Society of Upper
Canada," 8 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 173.
Thomasset, Claude. 1981. "Les juristes non avocats au Quebec," 4 Canadian Legal
Aid Bulletin 89.
Trebilcock, Michael, and Barry Reiter. 1982. "Licensure in Law" in Robert G.
Evans and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the Consumer Interest.
Toronto: BuHerworths.
Trebilcock, Michael, C. Tuohy, and A Wolfson. 1979. Professional Regulation: A
Staff Study of Accountancy, Architecture, Engineering and Law in Ontario. Toronto:
Professional Organizations Committee (Working Paper No. 17).
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre. 1981. Programme of Legal Studies
for Native People. Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre.
Veitch, Edward. 1979. "The Vocation of our Era for Legal Education," 44 Saskatchewan Law Review 21.
Yachetti, Roger D. 1983. "The Views of the Practicing Bar," 6 Canadian-U.S. Law
Journal 103.
Yale, Janet. 1982. "Public Attitudes Towards Lawyers: An Information Perspective," in Robert G. Evans and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the
Consumer Interest. Toronto: Butterworths.
Zemans, Frederick. 1979. "Canada," in Frederick H. Zemans, ed., Perspectives on
Legal Aid: A Comparative Survey. London: Frances Pinter.
- - -. 1982. "The Non-Lawyer as a Means of Providing Legal Services," in
Robert G. Evans and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Lawyers and the Consumer
Int~rest. Toronto: Butl:erworths.
- - - . 1983. "Recent Trends in the Organization of Legal Services," in W. J.
Habscheid, ed., Effectiveness of Judicial Protection and Constitutional Order. Bielefeld: Gieseking.
~-·]- - - . 1986. "The Changed Legal Profession." Osgoode Hall Law Journal
(forthcoming). _ _ - - ---__;.;==

